Lord Rooker: My Lords, where terraced homes are demolished, they will be replaced with good-quality housing of mixed tenure and mixed price, in full consultation with residents to keep communities together. Building work on one location in Liverpool will start in a few weeks. Moving Forward: The Northern Way is a document produced by an independently chaired regional development agency-led group. It does not propose a particular level of demolition; it simply quoted a report by the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies that talked about the need for possible demolition.

Baroness Hooper: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his helpful reply which gives more clarity to the situation. Given that Liverpool is due to be the European Capital of Culture in 2008 and that the motto for that year—"Liverpool, The World in One City"—is epitomised by the Granby Street district, one of the oldest multiracial communities which goes back well over 100 years, does the Minister agree that the desire of many homeowner residents in the remaining Victorian houses in that part of Liverpool to remain in their homes and preserve the value of their homes rather than see them demolished should be considered?
	Since English Heritage and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Rogers, an architect of world repute, advocate that the refurbishment of these buildings is the better, cheaper and more environmentally friendly option, cannot the Government at least do something about the absurd VAT rule which zero rates new build but imposes the full rate for the maintenance and refurbishment of traditional city dwellings such as these?

Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, having lived in a terraced Victorian house in Cambridge for several years—it was kind of updated with a bathroom, which it did not previously have—I wonder whether the Minister agrees that variety of architecture is what makes the beauty of a city, rather than having uniform rows and rows of characterless houses?

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I reject that outright. There is not a shred of evidence in the housing market Pathfinder areas of people being made homeless. Again I say to the noble Baroness that there is no presumption of demolition. I could take noble Lords to terraced housing which has been gutted and rebuilt internally to modern eco-standards—far better standards than those for modern houses. That was done for experimental purposes for lighting and heating. So there is not a programme for the demolition of these houses. Where they can be remodelled, we will do so, including knocking two into one by joining one to the back and one to the front, so that we can get decent quality housing.
	One of the problems with some of this monotone housing is that it was all built the same—the same size housing in street after street. When young couples living in these very tiny houses start having children, they move out. We do not get sustainable communities in those areas. In the general improvement areas and under the plans of the 1960s and 1970s, many houses that were saved from demolition were given a 30-year makeover. Thirty years have passed. You have to ask about dwellings which are that old and cannot be made sustainable: would it be good money after bad, or should we work with the community to provide more modern community areas in which they are involved? But there is no large-scale programme of demolition of terraced housing.

Lord Rooker: My Lords, a quite specific policy objective of the housing market Pathfinders—it has never occurred in any other programme, whether the general improvement areas, the housing action areas or the urban renewal areas—is to raise property values. In the past that has happened almost as a by-product of other work. We need to raise the values of these properties. It is unusual in the south-east to talk about falling house prices, but that is still the case. In parts of the north-east and north-west, house values have not got back to what they were 10 years ago.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, Heathrow Airport is one of the many positive selling points in London's bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games. The bid document makes it clear that Heathrow is the best connected airport in the world and that it has ample capacity to cope with the arrival of the Olympic family. It will be further enhanced with the opening of the new state of the art Terminal 5 in 2008.

Lord Lloyd-Webber: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. I am not going to bore the House with a whole litany of broken down jetties and bus trips enforced. I would just like to ask the Minister whether any pressure could be put on the British Airports Authority at least to maintain better the buildings that it has?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, that is an important consideration, but the British Airports Authority has extensive plans for Heathrow. In addition to the construction of Terminal 5, to which I just referred, there is massive investment in Terminal 3 to enable it to take the new large aircraft, the A380, and substantial improvements to Terminals 1 and 2. Some £8 billion will be spent over the next decade. There is a great deal of investment in Heathrow. I agree with the noble Lord that of course it could do with improvement, but certainly by the time of the Olympic Games Heathrow will be well-equipped to cope with the traffic.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, I am surprised that the noble Lord is not aware of the rule of the International Olympic Committee that one bid city does not comment on a rival bid while the process is going on. I do not intend to do so.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, it may be thought that I can only resist temptation on one occasion. I can do it twice—I am not going to comment.

Viscount Waverley: My Lords, having waited 25 minutes this morning for a tow into the cul-de-sac at Terminal 4 on a flight from Dubai, should consideration be given to lifting the early-morning noise restrictions for just before and during the Games, if London is successful in the bid?

Lord Dixon-Smith: My Lords, for those who find Heathrow too much of a strain, I point out that the runway at Stansted Airport is only operating at about half its capacity at present. The British Airports Authority has a planning application in preparation to develop the buildings along Stansted airport to the point where they can handle that runway at full capacity, which will increase capacity there by 20 million passengers per annum, with far superior access to east London over Heathrow. Does the Minister agree that Stansted might make a useful additional facility, which ought to help the Olympic bid forward if access is considered to be a problem?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, the first thing to do is to put this into context. Teaching is a fully professionally qualified occupation. Approximately 15 per cent of teachers start their career as undergraduates, whereas the remainder go through postgraduate qualification systems. I have the data for 2002-03, the most recent year for which figures are fully available, and it is true those entering undergraduate teacher training courses had lower average attainment in pre-HE qualifications than those who were entering other degree courses. It is equally significant that by the time they graduated, their pattern of graduation qualifications, 2:1s and 2:2s and so on, were absolutely comparable with people graduating from other courses. I have no reason to believe that the additional attainment that they had achieved during their period at university is not something to celebrate.

Baroness Sharp of Guildford: My Lords, does the Minister agree that over the course of time the numbers of students taking undergraduate courses in education has been falling, and the number entering the profession through postgraduate courses has been increasing? Do the Government have any plans over the longer run to phase out undergraduate courses in education completely?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I am not aware of any plan to phase them out, although the statistics show that the postgraduate certificate is the major route. As I have said, 85 per cent and increasing enter that way. That means that people coming in already have a first degree in a specialist subject. The noble Lord, Lord Pearson, addressed that point. Even so, those teaching in primary schools, where they will on average be teaching around nine subjects, cannot have A-levels or a specialist degree in nine subjects. Yet, we also want people with excellent ability in primary education.

Baroness Morris of Bolton: My Lords, is the Minister aware of the Ofsted report of last November which found that one third of trainee sixth-form and FE college teachers did not have the equivalent of a GCSE grade C in English or maths? Is he content with that? If not, will he give the House some indication of what action the Government intend to take?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, we want people with the best attainment levels entering teaching, because it is so vital. Any slippage in one sense would be a cause of concern. However, I ask the House to reflect a little on the history of how people have entered teaching. Directly after the war, a very large number of people entered teaching without any formal qualification, but went through a heavily accelerated process in the emergency teaching scheme. It could be said that they were not qualified in the ways that we would like to see today, but they were the people who made sure that education in this country was of an exceptionally high standard in the period which followed the war, with those shortages.

Lord Warner: My Lords, we are generalising a bit in the area, but a typical annual cost per patient for this class of drugs would be about £1,000, which is relatively low compared with some other drugs. For example, the annual cost of some drugs for treatment of rheumatoid arthritis is about £8,500 or £10,500. I emphasise that the recommendation is not a matter of cost. NICE is looking at the clinical effectiveness as well. We must have some trust in its capacity to evaluate the evidence available in the area.

Lord Warner: My Lords, NICE has a tremendous record in taking account of patients' views when preparing guidance. It makes particular effort to include patients and the public in the development of all its guidance. It also operates a citizens' council, a 30-member advisory body established to consult and advise on social, moral and ethical issues relating to its work. On this health technology appraisal, NICE consulted a number of patient care groups, such as the Alzheimer's Society, Counsel and Care for the Elderly, Age Concern, the Dementia Care Trust and the Mental Health Foundation. It will continue to listen to advice from all those sources during the process of consultation.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
	:TITLE3:COMMONS AMENDMENTS AND REASONS
	[The page and line refer to HL Bill 34 as first printed for the Lords.]
	:TITLE3:LORDS AMENDMENTS
	1 Clause 1, page 1, line 3, leave out from beginning to end of line 16 and insert—
	"(1A) In this Act "control order" means an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.
	(1B) The power to make a control order against an individual shall be exercisable by the court on an application by the Secretary of State.
	(1C) The obligations that may be imposed by a control order made against an individual are any obligations that the court considers necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that individual in terrorism-related activity.
	(1D) Those obligations are—"
	The Commons agree to this amendment with the following amendments—
	1A Line 6, after "exercisable" insert "—
	(a) except in the case of an order imposing obligations that are incompatible with the individual's right to liberty under Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention, by the Secretary of State; and
	(b) in the case of an order imposing obligations that are or include derogating obligations,"
	1B Line 8, after "that" insert "the Secretary of State or (as the case may be)"
	1C Line 11, leave out "are" and insert "may include, in particular"
	8 Leave out Clause 3 and insert the following new clause—
	"Making of control orders
	(1) The court may make a control order against an individual if it—
	(a) is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity;
	(b) considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to make a control order imposing obligations on that individual; and
	(c) has been informed by the Director of Public Prosecutions that there is no reasonable prospect of a successful prosecution of the individual for the terrorism-related activity.
	(2) On an application to the court by the Secretary of State for the making of a control order against an individual, it shall be the duty of the court—
	(a) to hold an immediate preliminary hearing to determine whether to make a control order against that individual; and
	(b) if it does make such an order against that individual, to give directions for the holding of a full hearing to determine whether to confirm the order (with or without modifications).
	(3) The preliminary hearing under subsection (1)(a) may be held—
	(a) in the absence of the individual in question;
	(b) without his having had notice of the application for the order; and
	(c) without his having been given an opportunity (if he was aware of the application) of making any representations to the court;
	but this subsection is not to be construed as limiting the matters about which rules of court may be made in relation to that hearing.
	(4) At the preliminary hearing, the court may make a control order against the individual in question if it appears to the court—
	(a) that there is material which (if not disproved) is capable of being relied on by the court as establishing that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity;
	(b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the imposition of obligations on that individual is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism; and
	(c) that if the obligations that there are reasonable grounds for believing should be imposed on the individual are or include derogating obligations of a description set out for the purposes of the designated derogation in the designation order, the risk arises out of, or is associated with, a public emergency in respect of which there is a designated derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention.
	(5) The obligations that may be imposed by a control order in the period between—
	(a) the time when the order is made, and
	(b) the time when a final determination is made by the court whether to confirm it,
	include any obligations which the court has reasonable grounds for considering are necessary as mentioned in section 1(3).
	(6) At the full hearing under subsection (1)(b), the court may—
	(a) confirm the control order made by the court; or
	(b) revoke the order;
	and where the court revokes the order, it may (if it thinks fit) direct that this Act is to have effect as if the order had been quashed.
	(7) In confirming a control order, the court—
	(a) may modify the obligations imposed by the order; and
	(b) where a modification made by the court removes an obligation, may (if it thinks fit) direct that this Act is to have effect as if the removed obligation had been quashed.
	(8) At the full hearing, the court may confirm the control order (with or without modifications) only if—
	(a) it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the controlled person is an individual who is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity;
	(b) it considers that the imposition of obligations on the controlled person is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism; and
	(c) if the obligations to be imposed by the order or (as the case may be) by the order as modified are or include derogating obligations of a description set out for the purposes of the designated derogation in the designation order, it appears to the court that the risk is one arising out of, or is associated with, a public emergency in respect of which there is a designated derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention.
	(9) It shall be immaterial, for the purposes of determining what obligations may be imposed by a control order made by the court, whether the involvement in terrorism-related activity to be prevented or restricted by the obligations is connected with matters in relation to which the requirements of subsection (4)(a) or (8)(a) were satisfied."
	9 After Clause 3, insert the following new clause—
	"Duration and renewal of control orders
	(1) A non-derogating control order—
	(a) has effect for a period of 12 months beginning with the day on which it is made; but
	(b) may be renewed on one or more occasions in accordance with this section.
	(2) A non-derogating control order must specify when the period for which it is to have effect will end.
	(3) The court may renew a non-derogating control order (with or without modifications) for a period of 12 months if it—
	(a) considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for an order imposing obligations on the controlled person to continue in force; and
	(b) considers that the obligations to be imposed by the renewed order are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that person in terrorism-related activity.
	(4) Where the court renews a non-derogating control order, the 12 month period of the renewal begins to run from whichever is the earlier of—
	(a) the time when the order would otherwise have ceased to have effect; or
	(b) the beginning of the seventh day after the date of renewal.
	(5) The instrument renewing a non-derogating control order must specify when the period for which it is renewed will end.
	(6) A derogating control order ceases to have effect at the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which it is made unless—
	(a) it is previously revoked (whether at the hearing under subsection (1)(b) or otherwise under this Act);
	(b) it ceases to have effect under section 5; or
	(c) it is renewed.
	(7) The court, on an application by the Secretary of State, may renew a derogating control order (with or without modifications) for a period of 6 months from whichever is the earlier of—
	(a) the time when the order would otherwise have ceased to have effect; and
	(b) the beginning of the seventh day after the date of renewal.
	(8) The power of the court to renew a derogating control order is exercisable on as many occasions as the court thinks fit; but, on each occasion, it is exercisable only if—
	(a) the court considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for a derogating control order to continue in force against the controlled person;
	(b) it appears to the court that the risk is one arising out of, or is associated with, a public emergency in respect of which there is a designated derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention;
	(c) the derogating obligations that the court considers should continue in force are of a description that continues to be set out for the purposes of the designated derogation in the designation order; and
	(d) the court considers that the obligations to be imposed by the renewed order are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that person in terrorism-related activity."
	12 Clause 5, page 6, line 14, leave out subsections (1) to (3)
	15 Page 7, line 12, leave out "Secretary of State" and insert "court"
	16 After Clause 5, insert the following new clause—
	"Criminal investigations after making of control order
	(1) This section applies where a control order has been made against an individual if it appears to the Secretary of State—
	(a) that the involvement in terrorism-related activity of which that individual is suspected may have involved the commission of an offence relating to terrorism; and
	(b) that the commission of that offence would fall to be investigated by a police force.
	(2) The Secretary of State must inform the chief officer of the police force that the control order has been made and that this section applies.
	(3) It shall then be the duty of the chief officer to secure that the investigation of the individual's conduct with a view to his prosecution for an offence relating to terrorism is kept under review throughout the period during which the control order has effect.
	(4) Where he considers it appropriate to do so in performing his duty under subsection (3), the chief officer must consult the relevant prosecuting authority.
	(5) In this section—
	"chief officer"—
	(a) in relation to a police force maintained for a police area in England and Wales, means the chief officer of police of that force;
	(b) in relation to a police force maintained under the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 (c. 77), means the chief constable of that force;
	(c) in relation to the Police Service of Northern Ireland, means the Chief Constable of that Service;
	(d) in relation to the Serious Organised Crime Agency, means the Director General of that Agency; and
	(e) in relation to the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency, means the Director of that Agency;
	"police force" means—
	(a) a police force maintained for a police area in England and Wales;
	(b) a police force maintained under the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 (c. 77);
	(c) the Police Service of Northern Ireland;
	(d) the Serious Organised Crime Agency; or
	(e) the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency;
	"relevant prosecuting authority"—
	(a) in relation to offences that would be likely to be prosecuted in England and Wales, means the Director of Public Prosecutions;
	(b) in relation to offences that would be likely to be prosecuted in Scotland, means the appropriate procurator fiscal;
	(c) in relation to offences that would be likely to be prosecuted in Northern Ireland, means the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.
	(6) In relation to times before the Serious Organised Crime Agency begins to carry out its functions, this section is to have effect as if—
	(a) the National Crime Squad were a police force; and
	(b) references, in relation to that Squad, to its chief officer were references to its Director General.
	(7) In subsection (5)—
	(a) "the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency" means the organisation known by that name and established under section 36(1)(a)(ii) of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 (c. 77); and
	(b) "the Director" of that Agency means the person engaged on central service (as defined by section 38(5) of that Act) and for the time being appointed by the Scottish Ministers to exercise control in relation to the activities carried out in the exercise of the Agency's functions."
	The Commons agree to this amendment with the following amendments—
	16A Line 3, leave out from "where" to "it" in line 4
	16B Line 5, leave out second "that" and insert "an"
	16C Line 8, after "offence" insert "is being or"
	16D Line 9, at end insert—
	"( ) Before making, or applying for the making of, a control order against the individual, the Secretary of State must consult the chief officer of the police force about whether there is evidence available that could realistically be used for the purposes of a prosecution of the individual for an offence relating to terrorism."
	16E Line 10, at beginning insert "If a control order is made against the individual"
	16F Line 11, leave out "this section" and insert "subsection (3)"
	16G Line 16, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
	"(4A) In carrying out his functions by virtue of this section the chief officer must consult the relevant prosecuting authority, but only, in the case of the performance of his duty under subsection (3), to the extent that he considers it appropriate to do so.
	(4B) The requirements of subsection (4A) may be satisfied by consultation that took place wholly or partly before the passing of this Act."
	17 Leave out Clause 7
	The Commons disagree with the Lords in its amendment but propose the following amendments to the words so restored to the Bill—
	17A Page 8, line 33, leave out "made or"
	17B Page 8, line 36, leave out "making"
	17C Page 9, line 3, leave out subsection (4)
	17D Page 9, line 15, leave out second "the" and insert "a"
	17E Page 9, line 34, leave out "(4) to" and insert "(5) and"
	17F Page 9, line 38, leave out "the order or its renewal" and insert "the renewal of the order"
	22 Clause 9, page 11, line 1, leave out "Secretary of State" and insert "court"
	23 Page 11, line 1, leave out from "exercise" to end of line 3 and insert "or performance of any power or duty under any of sections (Criminal investigations after making of control order) or for the purposes of or in connection with the exercise or performance of any such power or duty;"
	The Commons agree to this amendment with the following amendment—
	23A Line 2, after "duty" insert "of his"
	28 Page 13, line 14, leave out "make, renew, modify and revoke" and insert "make application to the court for the making, renewing, modification and revoking of"
	37 Clause 12, page 14, line 37, leave out subsection (3)
	The Commons disagree to Lords Amendments Nos. 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17, 22, 28 and 37, but propose Amendments Nos. 37A to 37O in lieu.
	37A Page 4, line 36, at beginning insert—
	"(A1) The Secretary of State may make a control order against an individual if he—
	(a) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity; and
	(b) considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to make a control order imposing obligations on that individual.
	(A2) The Secretary of State may make a control order against an individual who is for the time being bound by a control order made by the court only if he does so—
	(a) after the court has determined that its order should be revoked; but
	(b) while the effect of the revocation has been postponed for the purpose of giving the Secretary of State an opportunity to decide whether to exercise his own powers to make a control order against the individual.
	(A3) A control order made by the Secretary of State is called a non-derogating control order."
	37B Page 5, line 2, leave out second "the" and insert "a"
	37C Page 5, line 12, at end insert—
	"( ) It shall be immaterial, for the purposes of determining what obligations may be imposed by a control order made by the Secretary of State, whether the involvement in terrorism-related activity to be prevented or restricted by the obligations is connected with matters to which the Secretary of State's grounds for suspicion relate."
	37D Page 5, line 12, at end insert the following new Clause—
	"Supervision by court of making of non-derogating control orders
	(1) The Secretary of State must not make a non-derogating control order against an individual except where—
	(a) having decided that there are grounds to make such an order against that individual, he has applied to the court for permission to make the order and has been granted that permission;
	(b) the order contains a statement by the Secretary of State that, in his opinion, the urgency of the case requires the order to be made without such permission; or
	(c) the order is made before 14th March 2005 against an individual who, at the time it is made, is an individual in respect of whom a certificate under section 21(1) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c. 24) is in force.
	(2) On an application for permission to make a non-derogating control order against an individual—
	(a) the function of the court is to consider whether the Secretary of State's decision that there are grounds to make the order in question against that individual is obviously flawed;
	(b) the court may give that permission unless it determines that that decision is obviously flawed; and
	(c) if it gives permission, the court must give directions for a hearing in relation to the order as soon as reasonably practicable after it is made.
	(3) Where the Secretary of State makes a non-derogating control order against an individual without the permission of the court—
	(a) he must immediately refer the order to the court; and
	(b) the function of the court on the reference is to consider whether the decision of the Secretary of State to make the order he did was obviously flawed.
	(4) The court's consideration on a reference under subsection (3)(a) must begin no more than 7 days after the day on which the control order in question was made.
	(5) The court may consider an application for permission under subsection (1)(a) or a reference under subsection (3)(a)—
	(a) in the absence of the individual in question;
	(b) without his having been notified of the application or reference; and
	(c) without his having been given an opportunity (if he was aware of the application or reference) of making any representations to the court;
	but this subsection is not to be construed as limiting the matters about which rules of court may be made in relation to the consideration of such an application or reference.
	(6) On a reference under subsection (3)(a), the court—
	(a) if it determines that the decision of the Secretary of State to make a non-derogating control order against the controlled person was obviously flawed, must quash the order;
	(b) if it determines that that decision was not obviously flawed but that a decision of the Secretary of State to impose a particular obligation by that order was obviously flawed, must quash that obligation and (subject to that) confirm the order and give directions for a hearing in relation to the confirmed order; and
	(c) in any other case, must confirm the order and give directions for a hearing in relation to the confirmed order.
	(7) On a reference under subsection (3)(a), the court may quash a certificate contained in the order for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) if it determines that the Secretary of State's decision that the certificate should be contained in the order was flawed.
	(8) The court must ensure that the controlled person is notified of its decision on a reference under subsection (3)(a).
	(9) On a hearing in pursuance of directions under subsection (2)(c) or (6)(b) or (c), the function of the court is to determine whether any of the following decisions of the Secretary of State was flawed—
	(a) his decision that the requirements of section (A1)(a) and (b) were satisfied for the making of the order; and
	(b) his decisions on the imposition of each of the obligations imposed by the order.
	(10) In determining—
	(a) what constitutes a flawed decision for the purposes of subsection (2), (6) or (7), or
	(b) the matters mentioned in subsection (9),
	the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.
	(11) If the court determines, on a hearing in pursuance of directions under subsection (2)(c) or (6)(b) or (c), that a decision of the Secretary of State was flawed, its only powers are—
	(a) power to quash the order;
	(b) power to quash one or more obligations imposed by the order; and
	(c) power to give directions to the Secretary of State for the revocation of the order or for the modification of the obligations it imposes.
	(12) In every other case the court must decide that the control order is to continue in force.
	(13) If requested to do so by the controlled person, the court must discontinue any hearing in pursuance of directions under subsection (2)(c) or (6)(b) or (c)."
	37E Page 5, line 12, at end insert the following new Clause—
	"Power of court to make derogating control orders
	(1) On an application to the court by the Secretary of State for the making of a control order against an individual, it shall be the duty of the court—
	(a) to hold an immediate preliminary hearing to determine whether to make a control order imposing obligations that are or include derogating obligations (called a "derogating control order") against that individual; and
	(b) if it does make such an order against that individual, to give directions for the holding of a full hearing to determine whether to confirm the order (with or without modifications).
	(2) The preliminary hearing under subsection (1)(a) may be held—
	(a) in the absence of the individual in question;
	(b) without his having had notice of the application for the order; and
	(c) without his having been given an opportunity (if he was aware of the application) of making any representations to the court;
	but this subsection is not to be construed as limiting the matters about which rules of court may be made in relation to that hearing.
	(3) At the preliminary hearing, the court may make a control order against the individual in question if it appears to the court—
	(a) that there is material which (if not disproved) is capable of being relied on by the court as establishing that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity;
	(b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the imposition of obligations on that individual is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism;
	(c) that the risk arises out of, or is associated with, a public emergency in respect of which there is a designated derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention; and
	(d) that the obligations that there are reasonable grounds for believing should be imposed on the individual are or include derogating obligations of a description set out for the purposes of the designated derogation in the designation order.
	(4) The obligations that may be imposed by a derogating control order in the period between—
	(a) the time when the order is made, and
	(b) the time when a final determination is made by the court whether to confirm it,
	include any obligations which the court has reasonable grounds for considering are necessary as mentioned in section (1C).
	(5) At the full hearing under subsection (1)(b), the court may—
	(a) confirm the control order made by the court; or
	(b) revoke the order;
	and where the court revokes the order, it may (if it thinks fit) direct that this Act is to have effect as if the order had been quashed.
	(6) In confirming a control order, the court—
	(a) may modify the obligations imposed by the order; and
	(b) where a modification made by the court removes an obligation, may (if it thinks fit) direct that this Act is to have effect as if the removed obligation had been quashed.
	(7) At the full hearing, the court may confirm the control order (with or without modifications) only if—
	(a) it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the controlled person is an individual who is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity;
	(b) it considers that the imposition of obligations on the controlled person is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism;
	(c) it appears to the court that the risk is one arising out of, or is associated with, a public emergency in respect of which there is a designated derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention; and
	(d) the obligations to be imposed by the order or (as the case may be) by the order as modified are or include derogating obligations of a description set out for the purposes of the designated derogation in the designation order.
	(8) A derogating control order ceases to have effect at the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which it is made unless—
	(a) it is previously revoked (whether at the hearing under subsection (1)(b) or otherwise under this Act);
	(b) it ceases to have effect under clause
	(c) it is renewed.
	(9) The court, on an application by the Secretary of State, may renew a derogating control order (with or without modifications) for a period of 6 months from whichever is the earlier of—
	(a) the time when the order would otherwise have ceased to have effect; and
	(b) the beginning of the seventh day after the date of renewal.
	(10) The power of the court to renew a derogating control order is exercisable on as many occasions as the court thinks fit; but, on each occasion, it is exercisable only if—
	(a) the court considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for a derogating control order to continue in force against the controlled person;
	(b) it appears to the court that the risk is one arising out of, or is associated with, a public emergency in respect of which there is a designated derogation from the whole or a part of Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention;
	(c) the derogating obligations that the court considers should continue in force are of a description that continues to be set out for the purposes of the designated derogation in the designation order; and
	(d) the court considers that the obligations to be imposed by the renewed order are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that person in terrorism-related activity.
	(11) Where, on an application for the renewal of a derogating control order, it appears to the court—
	(a) that the proceedings on the application are unlikely to be completed before the time when the order is due to cease to have effect if not renewed, and
	(b) that that is not attributable to an unreasonable delay on the part of the Secretary of State in the making or conduct of the application,
	the court may (on one or more occasions) extend the period for which the order is to remain in force for the purpose of keeping it in force until the conclusion of the proceedings.
	(12) Where the court exercises its power under subsection (11) and subsequently renews the control order in question, the period of any renewal still runs from the time when the order would have ceased to have effect apart from that subsection.
	(13) It shall be immaterial, for the purposes of determining what obligations may be imposed by a control order made by the court, whether the involvement in terrorism-related activity to be prevented or restricted by the obligations is connected with matters in relation to which the requirements of subsection (3)(a) or (7)(a) were satisfied."
	37F Page 6, line 14, after "a" insert "non-derogating"
	37G Page 6, line 22, after "a" insert "non-derogating"
	37H Page 6, line 30, leave out "by virtue of subsection (2)(d), make" and insert "make to the obligations imposed by a control order"
	37I Page 6, line 32, leave out from "obligation" to end of line 40 and insert—
	"(3A) An application may be made at any time to the court—
	(a) by the Secretary of State, or
	(b) by the controlled person,
	for the revocation of a derogating control order or for the modification of obligations imposed by such an order.
	(3B) On such an application, the court may modify the obligations imposed by the derogating control order only where—
	(a) the modification consists in the removal or relaxation of an obligation imposed by the order;
	(b) the modification has been agreed to by both the controlled person and the Secretary of State; or
	(c) the modification is one which the court considers necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by the controlled person in terrorism-related activity.
	(3C) The court may not, by any modification of the obligations imposed by a derogating control order, impose any derogating obligation unless—
	(a) it considers that the modification is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism; and
	(b) it appears to the court that the risk is one arising out of, or is associated with, the public emergency in respect of which the designated derogation in question has effect.
	(3D) If the court at any time determines that a derogating control order needs to be modified so that it no longer imposes derogating obligations, it must revoke the order."
	37J Page 6, line 44, after "(2)(d)" insert "or (3B)(c)"
	37K Page 7, line 12, after "State" insert "or the court"
	37L Page 10, line 27, at end insert—
	"( ) No appeal by any person other than the Secretary of State shall lie from any determination—
	(a) on an application for permission under (Supervision by court of making of non-derogating control orders)(1)(a); or
	(b) on a reference under section (Supervision by court of making of non-derogating control orders)(3)(a)."
	37M Page 10, line 33, at end insert—
	"( ) proceedings on an application for permission under (Supervision by court of making of non-derogating control orders)(1)(a);
	( ) proceedings on a reference under section (Supervision by court of making of non-derogating control orders)(3)(a);
	( ) proceedings on a hearing in pursuance of directions under section (Supervision by court of making of non-derogating control orders)(2)(c) or (6)(b) or (c);"
	37N Page 14, line 10, leave out from second "order" to end of line 11 and insert "made by the Secretary of State"
	37O Page 14, line 36, at end insert—
	"( ) Every power of the Secretary of State or of the court to revoke a control order or to modify the obligations imposed by such an order—
	(a) includes power to provide for the revocation or modification to take effect from such time as the Secretary of State or (as the case may be) the court may determine; and
	(b) in the case of a revocation by the court (including a revocation in pursuance of section (3D)) includes power to postpone the effect of the revocation either pending an appeal or for the purpose of giving the Secretary of State an opportunity to decide whether to exercise his own powers to make a control order against the individual in question."

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, the usual channels have proposed that, for the convenience of the House, the amendments should be grouped by topic and that a single Motion should be moved on each group of amendments. Therefore, I beg to move Motion A, which will be found on page 15 of the Marshalled List and covers Lords Amendments Nos. 1, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 28 and 37. The Motion is that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 1A to 1C to Lords Amendment No. 1, their Amendments Nos. 16A to 16G to Lords Amendment No. 16 and their Amendment No. 23A to Lords Amendment No. 23; do not insist on its Amendments Nos. 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17, 22, 28 and 37 to which the Commons have disagreed and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 37A to 37O in lieu thereof; and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 17A to 17F to the words restored to the Bill by the Commons disagreement to Lords Amendment No. 17.
	I think it would be wearisome for the House to go through all the issues at the same length as we have debated them over the past few days. Perhaps I may make three preliminary points. First, we proposed this Bill on the advice of the security services and the police to provide protection for the nation against the threat of terrorism. I hope that everyone in the House will accept our good faith in doing that, and I would expect any other government in power, having received that advice, almost certainly to have acted on the same advice.
	Secondly, I hope that we can debate calmly the issues relating to the steps that we have taken. I heard one noble Lord say on the radio this morning that this was being done by the Government only so that, if there were an atrocity during any election campaign, there would be someone else to blame. I deprecate such remarks. They are inappropriate and they bring this House into disrepute.
	Thirdly, I very much hope that people will recognise that we have made significant changes to the Bill in relation to representations made both here and in another place.
	I shall deal, first, with Motion A and identify the three significant changes or issues effected by this group of amendments. The first is judicial involvement in non-derogating orders. The Government listened very carefully to your Lordships on that matter. They very much understand the concerns expressed about ensuring that the rights of those made subject to such orders are properly considered and protected and that the measures imposed on them are appropriate and proportionate.
	Therefore, amendments introduced by the Government provide that the Secretary of State must apply to the High Court for leave to make a non-derogating order, save only where urgent action is required or any person is covered by the Part 4 provisions of the current 2001 Act. I shall return to those two categories in a moment.
	The procedure will therefore be that the Secretary of State will consider whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is involved in terrorism-related activity on an assessment of all the intelligence material provided. If he considers that there are, he will apply to the High Court for leave to make the order. If the court refuses leave, the order will not be made. There is therefore an important judicial assessment of the Secretary of State's judgment in each case before any order is made, subject to the two exceptions—urgency and Part 4—to which I referred a moment ago.
	If the court agrees that there is a case, it will give permission to the Secretary of State to make the order. Once made, the order will then be referred automatically to the court, which will arrange for a full hearing to take place as soon as possible thereafter. At the full hearing, the court will consider all the relevant material. It can decide what procedure it adopts. It will be able to hear the case in both open and closed sessions.
	As with derogating control orders, the subject will have access to the open material and his interests will be represented both by the lawyer of his choice in open sessions and by a special advocate in closed sessions. Again, the subject of the order will have access to the open judgment.
	The test to be exercised by the court in its full consideration will be one of judicial review. I make clear again, as I did before, that that will include consideration of the proportionality issues and the legitimate aim issues in the European Convention on Human Rights.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, I am sorry to stop the noble Lord but perhaps I may describe what has happened and then take interventions at that point. As the House will know, the Government's view remains that it is most appropriate for these orders to be made by the Secretary of State. But, in order to ensure that in the vast majority of cases there is judicial involvement before the order is made, we have in effect adopted the third way, or something very similar to it, proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson of Lymington. In effect, it was that, while the Secretary of State makes the orders, he can do so only with the leave of the court. We think that that is the right approach.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, in relation to these cases and in the terms that we are putting the measure into the Bill, our view of the law is that proportionality and whether it is a legitimate aim is something that the courts could consider. But I make it clear that that is what the Government intend by this wording.
	Moving on from the question of pre-judicial scrutiny before an order is made, I indicated that there are two exceptions. The first is urgency. There may be urgent cases where waiting for permission from the court is not an option. Those are cases where the Government need to take action immediately. In such circumstances, we submit that the Secretary of State should be able to make the order immediately. The Secretary of State will have to certify the urgency of the case in the order and, in that case, the order will take effect immediately. Where the urgent procedure is used, the Secretary of State must immediately refer the order to the court for confirmation within seven days and, if it is confirmed, the court will make arrangements for a full hearing.
	We have carefully considered whether it is possible to define "urgency" on the face of the Bill. We do not think it is either appropriate or necessary to do so. "Urgency" is a word in ordinary usage. The Secretary of State can make a judgment on it. Urgent procedure is likely to be used only rarely. The most likely circumstances would be where the subject matter of the order looked likely to disappear quickly. In those circumstances you would need to make an order very quickly to make it effective.
	The other exception is the Part 4 detainees under the terrorism legislation of 2000. The Government amendment also makes provision for the Secretary of State to make a non-derogating control order, without leave from the court, against the current Part 4 detainees, subject to a requirement that the cases must be referred to the courts immediately for confirmation of the order within seven days.
	In these cases, the courts have already considered and determined that there are grounds for suspecting each of them of being involved in terrorism, and that they pose a real threat to national security. It is extremely important in terms of protecting national security that we take immediate action in respect of them, so that they can be immediately controlled on being released from detention under the Part 4 powers. Any orders made against the current Part 4 detainees must be immediately referred to the High Court for confirmation and, if confirmed, then, again, the court will make arrangements for a full hearing of their cases as quickly as possible thereafter.
	For these reasons, in relation to the judicial involvement in non-derogating orders, the Government believe that they have listened, and have put a system in place which appropriately strikes a balance between the need for the Secretary of State to be able to reach judgments on national security issues, and the need to ensure that those decisions are subject to legal scrutiny in the vast majority of cases before being actioned. In that small minority of cases where that is not possible, it will be brought before the courts as quickly as possible.
	The second issue raised in this group is a very important one, namely burden of proof. Control orders are preventive orders, not punishments. They are designed to prevent future terrorist acts from being committed, not to punish what has been done in the past. That can only be done by the criminal process. What is required is an assessment of the overall security situation, of the risks posed by particular individuals, and of what measures are necessary and proportionate to meet those risks.
	"Balance of probabilities" is a high test, and the Government do not believe that it is appropriate for a once-for-all control order. The making of such orders involves the assessment of threat posed through the individual's past conduct and the risk of further such conduct, based on intelligence material as opposed to evidence about what has happened in the past. It is then for the Secretary of State and the court to determine what controls are needed to meet the threat and mitigate the risk that has been identified. It is an assessment of what is best in order to reduce the risk to the public. It must take the interests of the suspect into account. A balance needs to be struck.
	"Reasonable suspicion" is a better and more appropriate test when analysing intelligence material and drawing inferences from it. Both the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and the Court of Appeal have accepted this not only as being right in relation to the Part 4 target, but in relation to what Lord Justice Laws said in the A case. He said that if you imposed a balance of probabilities test at this stage it would frustrate the purpose of the policy, particularly when you are looking at disparate groups, where you are bringing together evidence from a wide range of sources and seeking, not to prove whether they did something in the past, but whether, looking at everything, the risk justifies the order that is made. On the basis of the advice that we have received, the effect of requiring a "balance of probabilities" test for this would frustrate the policy in precisely the way that Lord Justice Laws, sitting judicially, thought it would.
	This matter has been back to the Commons. Whatever view this House takes on this policy, I cannot believe that its wish is to frustrate the effectiveness of the non-derogating control orders. My understanding of the view of the vast majority of Members of this House is that they accept that there should be something in place. I earnestly ask them to think carefully about the burden of proof issue. If you introduce a burden of proof that makes it impossible for the policy to be effective, that would, in effect, frustrate the policy that the other place has accepted and that the Government are putting before the House. The courts have already said that it would frustrate that policy.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, we agree that there is a serious terrorist threat. We agree that the principal means of reducing that threat is by criminal prosecutions brought against a suspect in the regular criminal courts. We agree that there will still be a small number of cases in which there may be insufficient evidence for a prosecution, yet a means of control, a control order, is appropriate, imposing stringent conditions.
	We also agree that it is possible to envisage a national emergency of such enormous proportions that it would be necessary to bring before Parliament for approval an order derogating from the right to liberty and security of the person—Article 5 of the European convention. All parties, all around the House agree that such conditions do not arise at the moment. If they did and if such a derogating order was made to bring about a designated derogation, we agree that a control order could impose restrictions that would effectively deprive the controlled person of his liberty.
	So the issue is largely one of process. The process here is very important, if not vital. We insist that the decision to impose a control order be a judicial decision, made in accordance with due process and with necessary safeguards and guarantees against injustice. We say that because it is the perception of injustice, orders based merely on reasonable suspicion, for example that may inflame communities and increase the danger of creating more terrorists than we can control either by imprisonment or the orders. There is another side to the coin.
	The Government's concession on judicial involvement for the making of non-derogating control orders amounts, in our view, to nothing of great significance. The Bill as originally drafted provided that once the Secretary of State had made his decision to impose a control order, it was the controlled person himself who had to initiate an application to the court for judicial review of that decision and to make enquiry as to whether that decision was procedurally flawed. It is common sense that a person who was made subject to a control order by the Secretary of State would not simply shrug his shoulders and take it on the chin, but would immediately exercise his right to apply for judicial review under the Bill as originally drafted, especially as legal aid is automatic.
	Judicial review means that the court can do no more than oversee the exercise by the Secretary of State of his powers. The latest case between the Judicial Committee of this House in 2003 emphasised that the court's task is not to substitute its own view for that of the decision-maker but to review the decision, although with an intensity appropriate to all the circumstances of the case. The Government's concession which, as my noble friend Lord Goodhart said earlier, has been portrayed as permitting the court to make the decision in non-derogating orders, is not that at all. It is simply this. Rather than placing the burden on the controlled person to apply for judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision, the concession is simply that the Secretary of State must himself automatically bring the control order decision before the court. Otherwise, nothing has changed.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, certainly he has to. The point that I sought to make a moment ago is that it is inconceivable that a person against whom a control order had been made as proposed in the original Bill would not have sought to test it in the courts as soon as he possibly could.
	Under the present proposal, the courts will still not be able to decide the case on its merits, nor to decide which obligations are appropriate and necessary. It will still be the Secretary of State who makes those decisions. He will make an executive order that may severely limit the liberty of the individual, whether he be a foreign national or a British citizen. It is that which is so objectionable, so contrary to the genius of the common law of this country, as I referred to it on Second Reading, referring as your Lordships may recall, to a 1765 case.
	Our amendments, therefore, bring together the procedures for both the derogating and non-derogating orders into a single procedure and ensure that it is the court which makes the orders, based on evidence placed before the court by the Secretary of State, and that it is also the court which decides on the particular obligations in the particular case. It will be for the court to judge whether the control order deals with the risk presented by that individual proportionately to the degree of restraint that is required of him.

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor mentioned three points in support of his amendment from another place. The first one was the balance of probabilities and the general question of the burden of proof test. The second was the role that the prosecutorial authorities ought to play in control orders. The third was the judicialisation of the non-derogating procedure. I should like to deal with each one of those.
	First, regarding the burden of proof, our amendment makes a big move in the direction of the Commons. We now accept that, at the leave stage, the test should be reasonable suspicion, and not balance of payments—balance of probabilities, rather. My mind must have been on other things.
	We listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord said about that, and responded constructively. I am extremely surprised that he has not been prepared to do the same thing towards us. As to his arguments about the balance of probabilities, I can only refer the noble and learned Lord to the interventions made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and my noble friend Lord Forsyth. My noble friend made a telling intervention when he said that we would come to an absurd situation if the more serious the anticipated offence to be committed by the potential controllee, the more demanding the test that had to be applied before he was restrained. That is precisely the position the Government would get themselves in if they followed the logic of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor.
	Secondly, although we accept that control orders will have a part to play in the new situation of international terrorism that we now face, prosecution must nevertheless be the first option. I am bewildered as to why the noble and learned Lord has not been prepared to accept our amendment on the DPP. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has said, the DPP is now the designated prosecutor. We have gone to a great deal of trouble to make the DPP completely independent of the political process; yet what does the noble and learned Lord do? He seeks to replace the DPP with the Secretary of State referring cases to the responsible police authority. That is a politicisation of the process. It removes the independence that we have inserted and reintroduces the role of a politician, which we deplore.
	Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the question of the role of the judge. The noble and learned Lord contends that the amendment from the Commons on the non-derogating procedure is a judicialisation of what was previously a political process. It is not. Whether innocently, negligently, or even, dare I say it, intentionally, it is deeply misleading to say that this will become a judicial process just because of the amendment put in by another place.
	First, the Secretary of State can still make an order if there is an emergency. He is perfectly entitled, if he wants, to say that every situation he deals with is an emergency. What is to prevent him doing that? There is nothing in the Bill to prevent him doing that. Even if it goes before the court, the test of "obviously flawed" that the court has to meet is well below even the test that applies in judicial review. It is almost inconceivable that a court would ever be able to find that an order of that nature was flawed.
	It is incomprehensible that the Government are not prepared to accept our approach. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, spoke tellingly of the foolishness of trying to have two separate procedures for derogating and non-derogating orders, when no one knows which one it is going to be until the judge has made a pronouncement. We have produced an amendment which meets many of the points made by the Government and, at the same time, ensures the security of the country, but is fair to the citizen.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, it may be that we have come the moment when we should make a decision on this matter.

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, in that case, will the Minister agree? I will not go into the question of the Secretary of State and the judge now, because I have to tell the House right away that I would not have given way from the original positions. I do not think that a judge should make these decisions. I think that they should be made by a secretary of state. Would he further agree that there is no reason why this could not be the same kind of parallel as in the Interception of Communications Act, where the Secretary of State signs and the judge then comes in on review? Would he not agree—

Noble Lords: My Lords, say sorry!

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, in speaking to this Motion I shall also speak to Motion D. As your Lordships are aware, we regard the substance of Motion C and Motion D as being intimately linked.
	Motion C deals with the role that the Privy Council committee would play preparatory to the sunset clause biting. It is vital when we reconsider the Bill at the end of its life that proper preparation has been made for the new measure. Since the main purpose of the Bill is to deal with matters connected with security and evidence which derive from security sources, it is wholly appropriate that the committee charged with this responsibility should be composed of Privy Counsellors.
	It is equally true that, without the sunset clause dealt with under Motion D, it would be extremely difficult for this committee of Privy Counsellors to be taken seriously. We have evidence about that from the experience of the committee presided over by the noble Lord, Lord Newton of Braintree. That committee spent a great deal of time investigating the issues that are currently before your Lordships' House under this Bill, yet its recommendations were wholly ignored. That would not be the case if there were a sunset clause.
	As far as Motion is concerned—the sunset clause—we have already had several long debates on this matter already. There are two issues. First, should there be a sunset clause? Secondly, if there is, when should it bite?
	Our view on the first issue is that this situation unquestionably requires a sunset clause provision. The Bill suspends the fundamental rights of the citizen of this country. It should be reconsidered by Parliament on a regular basis until we no longer need it. That complies with the most vital principles of our constitutional history. I hope that none of your Lordships would feel, in any way, that that principle ought to be questioned.
	The second issue is when the sunset clause should come into operation. Our amendment gives the appropriate date as next November. I gave the reasons for this in the course of the Committee and Report debates. The Bill has been looked at at such speed, and scrutinised so inadequately, that as soon as it can be replaced by a better version the better. In our view, November gives adequate time for the Government to consider these matters.
	There is a particular issue here to which I trust the Government will give special attention—that is, the issue of devising a new offence for those who are in the process of preparing to commit a terrorist offence. It is vital that we get such an offence on the statute book as quickly as possible so that in future those who would largely be covered by control orders over the next six months are thereafter dealt with by the criminal law under a proper prosecutorial process ending up with the final decision taken by the jury. We want that measure on the statute book, I repeat, as quickly as possible. I see no reason why that cannot be achieved by November.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, has also tabled a sunset clause; and we are delighted that she has been prepared to accept the principle that we regard as so important. For the reasons that she gave at Report, the noble Baroness feels that the November deadline is too tight. She would prefer a deadline of 30 March 2006. The noble Baroness will no doubt have the opportunity to talk to her amendment in the course of this debate and I look forward with interest to hearing what the noble Baroness has to say. I beg to move.
	Moved, as an amendment to Motion C, Amendment C1, leave out from "House" to end and insert "do not insist on its Amendments 27, 31 and 32".—(Lord Kingsland.)

Lord Carlile of Berriew: My Lords, it may assist the House if I say a few words about the process of review. As the person who has had the responsibility of conducting the reviews of the detentions under the 2001 Act, I do not wish to speak about the uncertain consequences of my reviews, which have been brought home to me in recent days. I have had the experience of hearing my reviews cited in support of entirely opposite arguments on the same issue within minutes of one another, even on the much referred to "Today" programme. I shall reflect on the consequences of reviews that bring about that result.
	I want to say something that I regard as important about the process of the type of review that I have been conducting, which would be removed if the Lords amendments, rejected by the Commons, were reinstated. The effect of one of those amendments would be to remove the role of a reviewer from the procedures. It may therefore be of assistance to the House if I tell the House very briefly some of the things that the reviewer has to do, which I do not believe can be carried out effectively by a committee—even, dare I say, a committee of Privy Counsellors.
	That is not to say that I am venturing a judgment on the issue of whether there should be a committee of Privy Counsellors. The last committee of Privy Counsellors chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Newton, who is sitting next to me, was very effective and it is not for me—indeed, it would be inappropriate for me—to give an opinion about whether there should be a committee of Privy Councillors.
	If control orders are to be introduced, even if they were only non-derogating control orders, they would have an effect on the lives of the controlees. There would be certain things that they would be able to do, certain things they would be completely unable to do and many things that they would be able to do only under the circumstances controlled by the court orders. In dealing with the detainees, I have done some of the following things that I do not believe could be done by a committee. I have sat with the detainees, having private conversations, at length, alone. I have taken steps to improve the dental care of detainees. I was involved in an interesting incident that arose from the description on a Belmarsh menu of one of the lunch options as "halal pork chop". I was told later in a letter from the Prison Service that that was a piece of inadvertence by a member of the staff—you can say that again.
	I have been involved in looking at the prayer arrangements that are made, which could be a very significant issue for people who are the subject of control orders. I have been involved in issues concerning visits by families and the interpretation offered at those visits. I have been involved in issues concerning the visit of members of a detainee's family from abroad. I could cite a host of such issues which have been referred to only in the most general terms in my report.
	What I really want to say is this: if there is to be no reviewer carrying out the kind of reviews that I have been conducting under this legislation, something potentially of significance and importance to the controlees will be lost. That would be detrimental. It would diminish the opportunity of people whose liberty is constrained to an extent by control orders, to enjoy to the maximum the civil rights that remain available to them. If there is to be any change in the draft legislation in relation to the reviews, it should not remove the position of the reviewer. In my view, the role that I have carried out—I am not making a personal point because I very much do not want to do that—on the 2001 Act and indeed the role that I and my predecessors have carried out—and there have been several much more distinguished predecessors than me—under the Terrorism Act 2000 and its predecessors have been of considerable value.

Baroness Hayman: My Lords, my noble friend is absolutely right. It is also a job for other people as well. We have had very little opportunity to hear what interests people outside this House in terms of this Bill. We have not had the normal process where those with interest and expertise consult their own memberships, look at their own views, and put those forward to us. I want to see that before we next look at the legislation.
	For the reasons that my noble friend has adumbrated, among others, November is not a sensible date, and nor would much longer than year be acceptable, given that we all know we are dealing with imperfect legislation. I want a comprehensive review within a year's time. My noble friend, in her introduction, said that we can have that, but that the Government are giving it to us by different means; by an annual renewal order after a review. She explained clearly why; because there would be another legislative vehicle, there would be more opportunity than normal in a renewal order to have a proper look at this.
	I am not yet convinced that that is true, not because I question the goodwill at all, but for two reasons. First, we have experience of renewal orders on Part 4 of the 2001 act, on the Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act, and in all sorts of circumstances. It is easy for renewal to become a ritual rather than a proper review. Secondly, it is also very difficult. When you are simply looking at an order, you have no opportunity to amend, and you get to the situation where it is this legislation or nothing. We will have the same sorts of debate about how, if we do not have renewal, the security situation will be damaged. That is my fear of relying solely on renewal.
	I understand that in another place yesterday and today my noble friends on the Front Bench are trying hard to make this "renewal plus"; to make it seem a better and more comprehensive procedure. Yet, for the very reason my noble friend put forward—that we will be having another legislative vehicle and these issues will inevitably be discussed as part of that—putting in the sunset clause seems less of a problem than it would normally be.
	In recognising that we have not legislated perfectly—that we need to look at these provisions in more detail, not in the heat of a pre-general election campaign and not with a huge and artificial deadline before us—I hope that the Government will reconsider whether so much will in fact be lost from their proposal if they accept my amendment.

Lord Lloyd of Berwick: My Lords, I am glad again to follow the noble Baroness as I did a day or so ago, and again find myself in complete agreement with everything she has said. This House has a limited constitutional right to delay non-money Bills. It is said that the Bill before us could not be delayed because of 14 March deadline, but I have never accepted that there was the urgency in this matter that others seem to have accepted. There is, so far as I know, no evidence that the danger today is any greater than it was in 2001—if anything, it is slightly less—and, since then, this sort of legislation has not been applied to British citizens. The existing legislation has been adequate to protect us.
	Let us suppose that there is the urgency which is suggested. If we cannot for that reason delay the Bill, surely we have a constitutional right to see that the Bill is considered again at the earliest opportunity. That is why, for all the reasons mentioned by the noble Baroness, I shall be voting for the sunset clause, whether for November, or for March as she suggests. It must be a sunset clause as a renewal of the Bill is not enough for all the reasons mentioned so often. It must come to an end at a defined date so that, before that date, we can have a chance to reconsider what the proper legislation is to put in its place.
	On the question of what we could be doing until the sunset date, it seems apparent that the suggestion of a review by five Privy Counsellors is eminently sensible. However, I had not realised that the effect of the present situation, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, has brought to our attention, is that if we have the five Privy Counsellors, we will not have him. I would be entirely against that. I had not realised that that was the effect, and am sure it is not the intended effect.
	Clearly, the noble Lord must continue with the noble work he is already doing, but what he is doing is not enough for this purpose—that is no discredit to him because it is not what he is required to do. I am in favour of a review by the five Privy Counsellors, and do not see the difficulty—in entire agreement with my noble and learned friend Lord Ackner—in that being done between now and November. What actually is the difficulty?
	My last question is on the proposed new offence of preparing to commit an act of terrorism, which I am delighted to hear the Government now favours. I actually recommended this offence 10 years ago. Five years ago, I tried to get it into the Terrorism Act 2000, but the Government resisted it. It is wonderful that even at this time they are at last converted to the idea, but again, why can we not have that before November, before the sunset date? It does not take that long to draft a new offence—we get one every three days anyway.

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: My Lords, the speech made a few moments ago by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, seemed to make eminent sense. Looking around your Lordships' House, I believe that there are few people—with the exception of those who are on the government Front Bench and under instruction— who would disagree with the sense of that. I do not want to rehearse the arguments that the noble Baroness put, as she put them far more eloquently than I could. But there are a couple of other reasons why I believe that a sunset clause is important.
	The atmosphere at Prime Minister's Questions yesterday was not good, and for the Prime Minister to characterise this as some sort of political test was not helpful. It is being suggested that the Conservatives and others should vote down this legislation and let the people decide. The sunset clause would put the legislation in place, the Government would get their Bill and the people could decide whom they wish to be the next government—but I am less concerned about that than about the parliamentary process itself.
	One constitutional argument in favour of our supporting the sunset clause, on which my noble friend Lord Waddington touched at an earlier stage in our proceedings, is that the House of Commons has the right to consider the legislation properly. It has not had that opportunity. By having a sunset clause, there would be an opportunity after the election, when the atmosphere is less frenetic, for the House of Commons to consider it properly. If the elected House has a proper length of time to debate and consider all these matters and if people outside have a chance to make their representations, with a proper timetable between the various stages of considering the legislation, then I accept that the Government must have their legislation.
	But for the Prime Minister to say that he is prepared to lose the Bill, rather than have a sunset clause, reminds me of a time when I was a Minister and my private secretary came in and said, "Now, Minister, you've got five minutes to throw your toys out of the pram, and then we'll focus on the reality of this issue". The Prime Minister is throwing his toys out of the pram at the moment. Any rational person would come to the conclusion that if he could have his Bill, provided that he made an opportunity for the House of Commons and the House of Lords to consider it properly at a later date—any Prime Minister who was concerned about the security of our country and the integrity of the House of Commons and the House of Lords—he would grab that with both hands.
	I want to make one other point, which relates to what the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, has been saying repeatedly—I mean no criticism of making a point repeatedly if it is a good point. He has made the point repeatedly that perhaps 30 November may be too soon. Now, I am not wedded to the 30 November date; apart from anything else, it is St Andrew's Day, which does not seem to me an appropriate day on which to discuss such matters, as it is a day for celebration. So whether the date is 30 November or 31 March, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, suggests, seems to me a side issue. The real issue is that there should be proper consideration of this matter.
	I respectfully suggest to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that he should lean on his colleagues and draw their attention to the proposal made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and the feeling in this House, and not seek to get us into a game of parliamentary chicken on an issue as important as the security of our country.

Lord Joffe: My Lords, having practised as a human rights lawyer in South Africa at a time when house arrest and a range of other oppressive laws had been passed allowing the authorities arbitrarily to deprive citizens of the protection of the courts, I would like to speak briefly. I will make only one significant point on the sunset clause.
	Those laws in South Africa were used indiscriminately: both against individuals of whom the Government had good reason to be suspicious; and against those who in criticising the Government were simply exercising their democratic right to freedom of speech. They resulted in great hardship and harm both to innocent people and—perhaps even more importantly—to their spouses and children.
	I do not for one moment compare the evil former South African Government with our own Government, many members of which in those days were ardent supporters of human rights in South Africa. However, sadly, in one respect our Government are using the same tactics as the South African Government used by insisting that the safety of the population is at risk unless the laws that they are seeking to rush through are urgently passed without proper consideration and deliberation.
	In South Africa that unjustified urgency and implicit threat led to a spineless Opposition—with the exception of one courageous Member of Parliament, Helen Suzman—that supported the appalling legislation, because they thought that they would be seen to be weak on terrorism. Fortunately, unlike the former South African opposition parties, the Opposition in this Parliament have behaved courageously and with integrity and a proper respect for the laws and traditions of this country despite the Government's efforts to portray them as weak on terrorism.
	It makes no sense for the Government to suggest that a sunset clause would be an indication of weakness in the fight against terrorism. A sunset clause must surely be the rational response to the issues raised in the House. It gives the Government what they seek for enforcing the law until the clause becomes operative. It also gives the opportunity to those who oppose this legislation to ensure that proper and thoughtful legislation is crafted which will properly balance the requirement to defend the country against terrorism while ensuring that there is only the minimum diminution of the rights of individuals, through the protection of the courts.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: No, my Lords, with the greatest respect, I said that the two issues were linked. I put the background so that we could understand how the first Motion we were going to debate related to the second. I did not say that I was going to answer both Motions together. I absolutely understand that the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, said that he would speak to both Motions at that point. I did not rise to my feet to indicate that that was not something which we were perfectly happy should take place.
	Perhaps I may therefore deal with the first Motion, to which I have spoken already. It brings us back to the import of the amendments that we have passed. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is absolutely right. If the House insists on the amendment that it has made to the Bill, the role of the noble Lord, or someone in his position as a reviewer, will go, and in its place will come the committee. So it is a very important matter for the House to consider in determining how to vote on that issue. That is what we are saying. The Government have twice now said that we need someone to play the role that has been played by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in relation to Part 4. For all the reasons that he has given, the level and the depth of the scrutiny that such a reviewer pays to the detailed needs of those detained or adversely affected by Part 4 or who would have their rights and liberties restricted as is now proposed by the conditions attached to the new proposed orders, are significant.
	The Government strongly believe that, just as it was necessary for someone to review independently those matters in terms of the operation of the Bill and how it infringes on the liberties of the individual, those matters still need the acuity and attention that such a reviewer would give. If this House insists, it will be telling the other place for the second time that the role of the noble Lord is not needed on this Bill. I cannot believe that that is the intent of your Lordships. Therefore, I urge your Lordships not to insist on that matter.
	I will now address the sunset clause. This House has always had to bow in the end to the other place, because the other place is the elected House. That remains a fundamental part of the democratic arrangements between the two Houses. It is right for noble Lords to remember that in the debates in the other place, the biggest majority was on the sunset clause. The other place spoke very clearly indeed, and this House also needs to remember the mood of that debate in the other place. It was clear that the House wanted to send a clear message to those terrorists and others who will be listening to what we say and looking and watching with a great deal of attention, that there will not be a gap and that there is no wavering on those powers.
	There is too an element of disagreement between those who seek a sunset clause, and I noted with great care the concept of a blank sheet of paper. People have said that they wish to start again. That is the position of those who say, with all integrity, that control orders of themselves are fundamentally wrong, and we should not have them. That view has been eloquently expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and others. That is one view. The majority of this House does not accept that position. The majority of this House and the other place accepts with the utmost reluctance, and some with a degree of pain, that control orders, in the situation in which we find ourselves, are an unfortunate, unwanted, unlooked-for necessity.
	It is unlikely, whether we are talking about November or another date, that we will be facing a position where we say that it is safe to expunge control orders. We are going to have them in some way or another in relation to that small cadre of people who will not be amenable to prosecution. That has been said in debates over and over again. We all agree that there is that small cadre who cannot be prosecuted, even if we are successful in bringing new legislation on to the statute book.
	I will address the issue of timing. Right around this House, it has been said that the legislation has been rushed; that there has not been appropriate time for consideration; that we have had a gun put to our heads as a result of the 14 March legislation; and that legislation made in haste is bound to be poor legislation. That is what the House was saying. What is our answer? The answer, if one were to push with the sunset clause, is to say, "We would like to do the same thing again".

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I wonder if I could finish. The noble Lord has been on his feet on a number of occasions, and this is the first time that I have been on mine for a significant time.
	When it comes to timing, we must look at the reality of the position with which we will be faced. My noble friend was right in saying that this will need scrutiny, not just by those in this House but by individual agencies and others who will have a view. This House may think that acts preparatory is the best way forward. We do not know whether that will be universally accepted elsewhere; we need to have that debate. If we need to have pre-legislative scrutiny, which I can anticipate—the noble Lords on the Liberal Democrat Benches, if nobody else, will voice that intent—that will take us time. It is likely that we will be running with a timetable even if we were to accept my noble friend's date of March.
	If we have an annual renewal, it will be in a situation where this House will be seized and know of the work that has been undertaken in relation to the new legislation. They will know whether those matters have been completed, and when it comes to renew that legislation this House will have the ability to have its say. In so many cases where annual renewal has been—

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, when the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, moves her amendment on the sunset clause I shall withdraw my amendment in favour of the noble Baroness's. I am delighted at the weight the noble Baroness's decision will give to the vote on the sunset clause, when we reach it. She is not only a distinguished former Front-Bencher from the government side but also, of course, a senior Privy Counsellor; and, in my submission, that adds, I repeat, great weight to her support for the principle of the sunset clause.
	I now wish to press my amendment to Motion C, which concerns the Privy Council. After we have voted on that, the question of the sunset clause will arise.

Lord Kingsland: had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. D1, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do not insist on its Amendment No. 33, but do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 33A to 33C in lieu thereof, to leave out from "House" to end and insert "do insist on its Amendment No. 33 and do disagree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 33A to 33C in lieu thereof".

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, in the light of the statement made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, in response to my question posed just before we took the previous vote, I shall not move Amendment No. D1.

[Amendment not moved.]

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: rose to move Motion E, that this House do not insist on its Amendments Nos. 38, 39, 40 and 42 to which the Commons have disagreed, and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 42A and 42B in lieu thereof, and do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment Nos. 42C but propose Amendment No. 42D in lieu of Commons Amendment No. 42C:
	42D Page 17, leave out lines 34 to end of line 1 on page 18 and insert—
	"( ) that in control order proceedings and relevant appeal proceedings the Secretary of State is required (subject to rules made under the following paragraphs) to disclose all relevant material;
	"( ) that the Secretary of State has the opportunity to make an application to the relevant court for permission not to disclose relevant material otherwise than to that court and persons appointed under paragraph 7;
	"( ) that such an application is always considered in the absence of every relevant party to the proceedings and of his legal representative (if he has one);
	"( ) that the relevant court is required to give permission for material not to be disclosed where it considers that the disclosure of the material would be contrary to the public interest;
	"( ) that, where permission is given by the relevant court not to disclose material, it must consider requiring the Secretary of State to provide the relevant party and his legal representative (if he has one) with a summary of the material;
	"( ) that the relevant court is required to ensure that such a summary does not contain information or other material the disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest;
	"( ) that provision satisfying the requirements of sub-paragraph (3A) applies where the Secretary of State does not have the relevant court's permission to withhold relevant material from a relevant party to the proceedings or his legal representative (if he has one), or is required to provide a summary of such material to that party or his legal representative.
	"(3A) The provision that satisfies the requirements of this sub-paragraph is provision which, in a case where the Secretary of State elects not to disclose the relevant material or (as the case may be) not to provide the summary, authorises the relevant court—
	(a) if it considers that the relevant material or anything that is required to be summarised might be of assistance to a relevant party in relation to a matter under consideration by that court, to give directions for securing that the matter is withdrawn from the consideration of that court; and
	(b) in any other case, to ensure that the Secretary of State does not rely in the proceeding on the material or (as the case may be) on what is required to be summarised.
	"(3B) In this paragraph "relevant material", in relation to any proceedings, means—
	(a) any information or other material that is available to the Secretary of State and relevant to the matters under consideration in those"

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, I shall deal first with the final point made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. I thank the noble and learned Lord for drafting this new amendment regarding exculpatory material. In my submission, the noble and learned Lord has moved significantly from the position that first featured in the Bill. I am content with what the noble and learned Lord has done, and we will not be opposing the amendment.
	As far as the group of amendments in Motion E is concerned, the crucial role they play in the scheme of things is to provide a judicial process for the judges that we substituted for the Secretary of State in the early part of the Bill. In our view, it would be wholly counterproductive to put a judge in charge of deciding whether a control order ought to be made, yet then require him to follow an executive procedure. Without these amendments, a judge will not, in effect, be operating in a judicial context.
	The arguments have been well tested, both in Committee and on Report. I need refer to them only briefly. I begin by saying that the Lord Chief Justice, and not the Lord Chancellor, should make the rules. There are two reasons for this. First, the situation in Scotland is that the Lord President makes the rules; and it is important that there is equivalence between ourselves and Scotland in the manner in which rules are made.
	Secondly, as with this legislation generally, if these rules eventually find themselves on the statute book, they will have got there in an extremely rushed fashion, and will have been imperfectly scrutinised. The great value of having the Lord Chief Justice making the rules, therefore, is that he will be standing outside the process and will be able to take an objective view about which rules are appropriate to a situation where the interests of the country are being balanced against the interests of an individual. The Lord Chief Justice is in a better position to do that than the Lord Chancellor, who will nevertheless be consulted on the Lord Chief Justice's decisions.
	The next point is that we think these rules should comply with Article 6 of the ECHR, the article which deals with due process. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, "We have already agreed to that. Why do you need it on the face of the Bill?", to which I respectfully retort that, if the noble and learned Lord is content that Article 6 should apply, what is the harm of putting it on the face of the Bill? If he is not prepared to do so, it suggests that one ought to be somewhat concerned about the nature of his undertaking. In my submission, your Lordships ought to vote to put the Article 6 requirement on the face of the Bill.
	The final component of this group is one that has been tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, and would give your Lordships' House the right, once the rules had been drafted, to have them laid before your Lordships' under an affirmative resolution procedure. Your Lordships would then not only have the guarantee of the rules being drafted by the Lord Chief Justice, but also the opportunity to look at them carefully and, at the end of the day, if necessary, reject them. That is what this group of amendments is about. I beg to move.
	Moved, as an amendment to Motion E, Amendment E1, leave out from "House" to end and insert "do insist on its Amendments Nos. 38, 39 and 40 to which the Commons have disagreed, do not insist on its Amendment No. 42 and do disagree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 42A to 42C in lieu thereof, but do propose Amendments Nos. 42D and 42E in lieu of Lords Amendment No. 42.—(Lord Kingsland.)

Lord Goodhart: My Lords, we are happy with the Government's new amendment, which, we accept, is a considerable step forward and deals with a problem that had been of some concern to us. We on these Benches are happy to support the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, in his insistence on Amendments No. 38 to 40.
	I shall spend a minute or two on our Amendment No. 42E. This arises from the matter mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, about the order, which I raised in an earlier amendment and was accepted by the Government, to apply an affirmative resolution procedure to the first set of rules made by the Lord Chancellor or the Lord Chief Justice, which would come into force immediately but would cease to have effect if both Houses did not approve them by a resolution within 40 days.
	When it came back from the Commons, certain provisions had been added, which effectively gave the Lord Chancellor power to make exactly the same orders all over again, immediately after the end of the 40 day period—and without any consultation. It seemed to me that that defeated the purpose of the amendment. I could see at the same time that there was a problem: that if, at the end of the 40-day period there had been no approval by both Houses, the orders would immediately lapse and they would have to be remade, and that might take some time.
	In Amendment No. 42E I have included a provision that removes the power of the Lord Chancellor to make the old rules again, but gives a 20-day breathing period, following the end of the original 40 days, which would allow time for new rules to be made and to be brought into effect before the original rules finally expired.

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, I have no doubt whatever that if they were in breach of Article 6 they would be struck down. My concern is that the noble and learned Lord accepts that a civil right is involved, but he does not accept that the later criminal provisions of Article 6 apply to the procedure. That is the difference between us and that is why we are keen that Article 6 remains on the face of the Bill.
	Perhaps I may put it as I did in my opening remarks. Why is the noble and learned Lord so concerned about Article 6 being on the face of the Bill if he is confident that he will meet the obligation? I respectfully invite your Lordships also to accept the amendment to the noble Lord's own amendment that has been tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I am very sympathetic to the motivation behind the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I want to give him the reassurance that he seeks about the clarity of grandfather rights. I know where these amendments come from and I well appreciate that the grandfather rights available in the Bill are scattered throughout it. Many of the assurances that have been given on them have been in the form of letters to Members of Parliament or in other ways. It is important that the grandfather rights, which are enshrined in the Bill and which I believe to be comprehensive, should be read into the record, as I propose to do now.
	The Government published a position paper on grandfather rights in February 2004, which might not have been brought to the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. It made clear that the Government would use the powers in the Bill to convert, automatically, a number of existing permissions into permissions under this legislation. I shall give the Committee the detail.
	Those promoting lotteries, subject to the registration requirements in Sections 5 or 6 of the Lotteries and Amusements Act, will be deemed, where necessary, to have a lottery operating licence under the Bill. Licences for betting offices, betting tracks and approved horse racecourses under the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 will become betting premises licences under Part 8 of the Bill. A machine permit under Schedule 9 of the Gaming Act 1968 for all cash amusement-with-prizes machines will become either an adult gaming centre premises licence or a family entertainment centre premises licence.
	Gaming or bingo licences under Part 2 of the 1968 Act will become premises licences too. Permits for miners' welfare institutes and other clubs will convert automatically into club gaming permits under the Bill. Machine permits for coin or token amusement-with-prizes machines will be converted automatically into new style category D machine permits, although new permits will not be available for premises like fish and chip shops, and so on. Lastly, premises licensed for the sale of alcohol that have a gaming machine entitlement now will, where necessary, be granted a permit under the Bill to carry on with exactly the same number of gaming machines as they have now.
	The House will know that it is quite normal for detailed transitional arrangements under legislation to be dealt with through secondary legislation, like that in Schedule 18 to the Bill to which the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, in its 11th report, passed no comment at all on the Bill's powers in that respect. So I hope I have been able to answer the first question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, asked me about Sections 16 and 21 machines and why the current level of stakes and prizes will not be the same under the Bill as it is now. We shall debate that on subsequent amendments and perhaps I can go into more detail then. Fundamentally, the principle is that the number and power, in terms of stakes, prizes and speed of play, of machines is proportionate to the nature of the premises; in other words, whether children are allowed in and the degree of hard gambling that takes place. I am very willing to defend our proposals for Sections 16 and 21 machine stakes and prizes on the grounds that that will be the theme of everything that I say on the precautionary principle in this Committee.
	The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, asked how many existing casinos are small or large. We do not have exact figures because we do not measure the table gaming areas in casinos. We have no authority to do that and I do not believe that he would wish us to do so. Our understanding is that only a minority of the existing casinos meet the minimum size requirements of the new casinos.
	While I am totally sympathetic to the purpose of the amendments, I believe that they are unnecessary. All the powers necessary to deliver fair grandfather rights are already in the Bill. A more substantial point on the amendments is that if they were accepted they would prevent the Government or the Gambling Commission or a licensing authority from using their powers in future to control entitlements to gaming and gambling machines. I submit that that would undermine the central purpose of the Bill.
	The main reason for introducing the Bill now is because the present law is being outpaced by technology. That is more than just a debating point. As the law is out of date, operators have tried to exploit loopholes to introduce new products that were never intended to be authorised under the law. I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, will agree that Sections 16 and 21 machines were never envisaged when the 1968 Act was passed, any more than fixed-odds betting terminals in betting shops were envisaged at that time. The reason we have roulette gaming machines in betting offices and family arcades is because the law is inadequate and in doubt and that is why we need the Bill.
	Section 16 of the 1976 Act and Section 21 of the 1968 Act were never intended to authorise the provision of gaming machines. So, the fact that these machines are being provided, in reliance on parts of the law never intended to authorise machine gaming, is part of the problem we are trying to solve. Our policy in the Bill, which I hope I have spelt out by the list that I have given, is to apply a single, coherent and comprehensive regulatory framework for gaming machines. We want to move away from the position where, because of supposed loopholes, it has been possible to provide gaming machines outside the regulatory framework of Part 3 of the Gaming Act 1968.
	It is absolutely essential that all of the regulatory authorities can use their powers to change licence conditions or entitlements if there is evidence that a particular product, or the way in which a product is being offered, is driving problem gambling or is causing a risk to the licensing objectives of the Gambling Commission. I will not compromise on that point. I know it has not been suggested, but I want to make it clear for the future that I shall not compromise on that point because our concern is to protect the public.
	We accept, of course, that the trade associations have agreed a code of practice with the Gaming Board that governs the provision of such machines. But that does not at all change our view on whether they should have been provided under these provisions in the first place. Given what I have said, and taking into account the use of the transitional powers under the Bill, I ask for these amendments to be withdrawn.

Baroness Buscombe: With the leave of the House I would like to speak not only to Amendments Nos. 2 and 3, but also to Amendment No. 4, given the time constraints placed upon us today. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, with the leave of the House, would also like Amendment No. 52A to be included in this group.
	Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 are contrasting amendments designed to discuss the Government's intention behind the Bill, something that is vitally important—particularly considering the constraints placed upon us—to the context of all the Committee amendments but I fear will otherwise be lost in the debate on the detail. These amendments flush out the thinking by adding an additional purpose to the licensing objectives in Clause 1.
	The amendments are self-explanatory. I would like to know from the Minister whether it is the Government's policy to prevent an overall increase in the incidence of gambling in the UK, or to enable it.
	In a statement on national policy made in December last year the Government stated that the Bill was based on three main objectives—to protect children and other vulnerable people from harm, to prevent gambling being a source of crime or disorder, and to ensure that gambling is conducted in a fair and open manner. Should we take these objectives within the context of my Amendment No. 2 or No. 3?
	The statement also said that Britain has a low level of problem gambling compared to other countries—less than 1 per cent of the population—and that the Government are committed to maintaining this record. How is the Minister committed to maintaining this record as the Bill currently introduces a range of regional and large casino facilities that are open to bids from companies over and above the existing estate? Or does he envisage a 50/50 increase by the existing estate versus newcomers?
	Does the Minister agree with many commentators that if you increase the access to gambling, no matter how well controlled, the numbers of those affected by addiction or problem gambling will rise? Or does the Minister hope that despite an increase in numbers the problem will remain within 1 per cent of those gambling overall, or that it will be the same 1 per cent just developing into increasing debt? GamCare's recent report shows—from what information it can obtain from clients—that debt has increased by £1,000 per individual: from £19,000 to £20,000 in the past year alone.
	Meanwhile the Government have also been criticised by academics who say that problems such as child gambling are far greater than the 5 per cent mentioned in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport's recent report.
	One of the reasons given for including the casino proposals in the Bill was so that this country could reap the increasing rewards of tourism and leisure industries contributing to our GDP. Yet a recent poll by UGov and the Gambling Consultancy stated:
	"Half the public are not persuaded that making it easier for people to gamble and for casinos to attract customers will boost UK tourism".
	Therefore I ask the Minister what estimated figures for foreign tourists who would come simply to gamble, as well as those who would happen to gamble while they are here, have Her Majesty's Government been basing the growth benefits on? Can he make them available to the House for consideration?
	It is against this background of concern that I am led to ask the Minister to state to the Committee now whether it is his intention to fulfil the broad objectives of the Bill with a view to prevent an overall increase in the incidence of gambling in the United Kingdom, or to enable it.
	Amendment No. 4 is suitably connected with earlier amendments. It is concerned with the need to protect low- income groups, along with children and the vulnerable. I would like to tease a little more detail from the Minister as to how gambling addictions affect different echelons of society. Of the 1 per cent who suffer this affliction in the United Kingdom, can he give me the breakdown by income groups and by those at different stages in their life cycle and place a copy in the Library? Would he not agree with me that when we refer to the vulnerable we are often referring to low-income families to which the activity of gambling can be regressive, not regenerative?
	It is essential that there are precautions in place to protect those low-income family members who cannot afford to lose at any cost. Does increasing access to gambling, despite safeguards, really offer the protection that such individuals need?
	Amendment No. 52A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, sets out proposals with regard to codes of practice which the Gambling Commission may introduce. The noble Lord is proposing an entirely sensible and wise condition, which is that before issuing or revising a code under this clause, the commission shall consult,
	"one or more persons who have specialist knowledge of the welfare of children and their families".
	I would go further than that. I would like to see such a person sitting as a full member on the commission itself. I would also hope that such a person would be consulted by the advisory panel. I beg to move.

Lord Northbourne: I should like to speak to Amendments Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 and to Amendment No. 52A in my name. I very much welcome the fact that the Government have included as a priority in the licensing objectives the protection of children and vulnerable persons. However, I do not entirely see this admirable policy unfolding in the body of the Bill. I hope that the Minister will help me on that.
	There are two major ways in which children can suffer from gambling. The first is by getting in the habit of gambling and becoming addicted gamblers. The second is by having parents who gamble and thereby impoverish the family, possibly causing family breakdown. Your Lordships may say, does this really matter? The answer is yes. There is now a mass of quality research which shows that children growing up in families in poverty and, a separate category, children growing up in single-parent families and families that are dysfunctional are more likely to have poorer health, poorer outcomes in school, and poorer outcomes in later life in terms of employment, crime and so forth, and in family formation later.
	In this country today we have 4 million children living in poverty, that means below the poverty line. Of those, about 2 million children are living in families which do not have enough money to provide some of the basic necessities of those children's lives. We have about 3 million children living in broken families. That is already a dangerously high level. I do not think we want through this Bill to increase the number of families in either of those categories.
	I am concerned by the picture I see emerging from the Bill of glitzy, glamorous new casinos and category A and B gambling machines advertised and promoted by personalities, film stars and football stars, and stories in the newspapers encouraging people to believe that gambling is an important lifestyle choice, in which if people do not participate they are deprived and disadvantaged. Probably the strongest danger is that people will attempt to go into the gambling arena because they feel that their status demands it or because they feel that they would be deprived if they do not. There will undoubtedly be large numbers of people who are disadvantaged in the sense that they do not have surplus money to spend on gambling, yet they will spend their money on gambling—it will come out of the housekeeping and it will leave more children in poverty. It will lead to more family discord, family breakdown and probably domestic violence as well.
	I hope that the Minister can show me how children and vulnerable families can be fully protected. If he cannot, I urge your Lordships to vote against what appears to be not only an unnecessary development of the gambling industry in this country, but also one for which there is little or no demand.
	As the noble Baroness suggested, Amendment No. 52A, suggests that the commission should consult someone with expertise about families with children. The noble Baroness is right; such a person ought also to be a member of the commission. The impact of gambling on children and families is very complex. Just because we have had children and families does not mean that we necessarily know the answers. This is a subject on which professional advice would be extremely important to the commission. Therefore, I intend to move that amendment in due course unless the Minister can convince me that it is wholly unnecessary to do so.

Baroness Howe of Idlicote: As these amendments are very much about children and the protection of children as well as low-income groups, I would like to speak to my amendments, which come somewhat later—Amendments Nos. 96, 97 and 99. The intention of these amendments is to bring the UK into line with the rest of the developed world and to stop children playing on fruit machines.
	As the Gambling Bill has passed through its various stages, it has become clear that there is confusion about category D machines. Although category D includes machines such as teddy bear grabbers and penny falls, it also includes certain types of fruit machines. These machines are identical to the varieties found in categories A to C except for their stake and prize. The amendment tabled to Clause 45 of the Bill would stop children playing on fruit machines but not on these other machines.
	There was confusion about this in the other place; one wonders whether some of it was deliberately designed to obfuscate a serious issue. However, I will be clear at the outset—our amendment would not stop children and young people playing on teddy bear grabber machines and penny falls. Contrary to the briefing sent to Peers by BACTA, this amendment would not prohibit children from playing on penny falls and other such games. The second part of our amendment clearly enables the Secretary of State to make those forms of games available to children and young people.
	Fruit machines constitute some of the most addictive forms of gambling. Many adults struggle to control their gambling on them, as the GamCare helpline statistics show. They are structurally more dangerous than lots of other forms of gambling. They are fast, aurally and visually stimulating and rewarding, they require a low initial stake, provide frequent wins and may be played alone. Players can experience frequent "near misses" which encourage them to chase their losses with the hope of doing better next time. All of those characteristics make them particularly attractive, and dangerous, to children.
	The only difference between a category D fruit machine and categories A to C is the stake and prize. In effect, children as young as five and six are being exposed to every other kind of addictive trait that they would be if they were playing a category A machine. For many children, £5 is not a small prize—it may be twice their weekly pocket money.
	By now, many Committee members will be aware that there is growing public unease about the status quo in the Bill. That is one reason why I wanted to speak to these amendments today. In less than a week, nearly 40,000 people have signed a petition organised by the Salvation Army, the Methodist Church and the National Children's Home—to which I am extremely grateful for a range of briefing—demanding that children be stopped from gambling on fruit machines. That is an impressive number in such a short space of time and shows the strength of public feeling on the issue. Perhaps one should not be surprised; in an NOP opinion poll, 82 per cent of people said that children and young people should not be allowed to gamble on fruit machines.
	BACTA makes much of the fact that in a YouGov poll 75 per cent of people said that they did not want to stop children playing on category D machines. Well, nor do I want to stop them playing on teddy bear grabbers or penny falls. But I do want to stop them playing on fruit machines. I have heard people say, even in this House, that "there is no evidence" that playing on fruit machines is dangerous to young people. I have to say to Committee Members that there is a significant body of evidence which all points towards fruit machines being unsuitable for children and young people.
	The Joint Scrutiny Committee on the draft Gambling Bill heard from the Royal College of Psychiatrists which said:
	"It has been firmly established that all gaming machines, regardless of the size of the stake or the amount of prize money, are unsuitable for children and young people".
	The Royal College of Psychiatrists also recommends that these machines should cease to be made legally available to them. The committee also heard evidence from other academic experts to the same effect. In fact, I believe that not one academic at that time gave evidence which contradicted this view. The DCMS commissioned a report from Lancaster University on this issue, but it has been roundly criticised by experts in the field for its many omissions and inaccuracies. However, even that report found that on average the rate of problem gambling among children and adolescents in the UK is around 5 per cent. That may sound a small figure, but it is one in 20 young people.
	Problem gambling among young people can cause huge difficulties—we have heard some of them mentioned—during the key phases of their development. It can involve truancy, as children spend more and more time at the machines and away from school; it can lead to fractured family relationships; it can even lead to a criminal record as young people turn to crime to fund their addiction. By the age of 18, young people can find themselves without much of an education, saddled with debt and carrying a criminal record. That is not a good way to be starting adult lives, and the activity that has contributed to this has be done perfectly legally. We really need to change that.
	Over the past few years it has been encouraging to see child protection issues march up the political agenda. I believe that we have a chance with this Bill to ensure that another piece of protective legislation is put in place. The Government have done much in the Bill to try to protect children and vulnerable people. By allowing them to carry on playing fruit machines, however, it has left a gaping loophole. The case is clear: gambling is and should be only an adult activity. Fruit machines, regardless of their size, can be addictive.
	The answer is that children should be prohibited from playing category D fruit machines, and the UK should now put itself on the same footing as the rest of the developed world. On the issue of children and gambling, the Government have come close to implementing a robust framework. The problem now is that they are failing to follow through on their own logic. If, as the Secretary of State says, "children and gambling don't mix", why are children still to be allowed to gamble on one of the most addictive games in the gambling industry? It is time to match up the rhetoric of child protection with the reality. It is the duty of society and, I believe, of this Government to try and protect these children from harm. By supporting the amendment when we come to it, we will have a wonderful opportunity to separate children from a potentially damaging activity. Frankly, without it, the UK will remain alone in the world in allowing children to do something that can ruin their lives.

The Lord Bishop of Southwell: I ask the guidance of the Minister, as I had hoped to comment at this stage, under the cover of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, and in support along the lines of the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, regarding Amendments Nos. 96, 97 and 99, to which my right reverend brother the Bishop of Coventry has added his name. If he would rather that I did not make that speech at this time, perhaps he would tell me? It is a brief one, but I will be guided by the noble Lord.

The Lord Bishop of Southwell: I thank the noble Lord. It is either now or later, I suppose. Like the overwhelming majority of people in this country, I believe strongly that gambling should be an adult-only activity. Indeed, I find it difficult to think otherwise. Gambling requires, we are led to believe, advanced mental processes which children simply do not have. The Secretary of State herself has said that children and gambling do not mix. Allowing children to gamble on fruit machines flies in the face of everyone's stated position, and it is a glaring anomaly.
	We have heard of the dangers of fruit machines, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, just a moment ago. We already know that some of the most potentially addictive forms of gambling arise and stem from fruit machines, even in adults, let alone children. It is completely unacceptable that the United Kingdom is the only country in the developed world that allows children to gamble on these machines. It is a national distinction that we should be ashamed of, rather than proud.
	I know that many noble Lords will have had a briefing from the Salvation Army and the Methodist Church which outlines messages they have received from the public about children and gambling. Some of them make depressing and poignant reading. They all testify to a significant element of concern about this whole issue in the country at large. One lady wrote:
	"I emigrated to the UK from Australia in 2000, and now live in a rural town on the east coast of Scotland. Coming from a country where gambling is legally permitted only for adults, I was shocked to find that my son (then age 9) could gamble on slot machines with his friends at the local amusement arcade. He was thoroughly smitten with this for a while, spent most of his pocket money on the machines, and I suspect he stole money from my purse on more than once occasion to fund his gambling. Although that stage seems to have passed, thankfully, I am very concerned that he was and still is at risk through gambling being available to him so easily".
	Another person wrote in:
	"I have personal experiences in how gambling can damage people and their family. Both my husband and I have been problem gamblers and it has caused many financial and emotional problems. Growing up in a seaside town I had easy access to arcades along with many other children. The ease in which somebody of any age can gamble on a fruit machine worries me so much".
	These are not just sad, isolated incidents. A convincing body of academic literature—some of it carried out at Nottingham Trent University in my own diocese—estimates that 5 per cent of adolescents display signs of gambling problems. To ignore that evidence is to turn a blind eye to significant amounts of damage being done to young people. As legislators, we have a clear duty to protect those in our society who are most vulnerable. This House has often shown great courage in putting the interests of children and young people first. This is another opportunity for your Lordships to extend that record.
	Experts who have spent time studying this issue are at one: gambling on fruit machines is dangerous for children. It is not just an academic issue. This is about children's lives. How would your Lordships like to see one of your seven-year-old grandchildren feeding a slot machine? I have two grandchildren. Felix is nine this year, Elliot is seven. They live in France and are not allowed to gamble there. Yet, if they come here and go to Minehead with my wife and I, they can gamble at leisure. They can do so perfectly legally. Eighty-two per cent of the population think we should stop that. So do I, and I encourage your Lordships to think again.

Viscount Ullswater: I was not going to be drawn into this debate. However, when I listened to the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Howe of Idlicote, I felt that I ought to put in just a little plug for the sort of family-run traditional seaside amusement centres that provide harmless entertainment for many thousands of visitors of all ages.
	In a previous existence, I was Minister for Tourism and I used to visit many seaside reports that were rather faded—that is probably the right way of putting it—showing a little run-down in investment. One of the reasons for that, of course, is that Spain has more sunshine and low-cost airfares attract a lot of people there for their summer holidays. However, even that may be out of the reach of the low-income families about whom the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, was talking.
	On a rainy day in Hunstanton, in Norfolk, the beach is not a very attractive place, but there is a very nice family-run entertainment centre where young people can go and while away what I suspect they would describe as a dreary afternoon playing with these category D machines. We have not mentioned the stake. The stake on a category D machine is, I believe, 10p. For a very small sum, not much more than they would need to go round the corner to buy a burger, chips and a soft drink, they can spend a relatively extended period having an extremely interesting afternoon which otherwise would be denied to them. I think we ought to get it into proportion; I understand the problems that may occur at a later stage, but I felt that I ought to add that tuppenny coloured.

Baroness Buscombe: I thank the Minister, as I am sure that all Members of the Committee will, because I recognise that noble Lords who spoke on Second Reading felt that this area was hugely important. As we have all accepted this evening, time may be of the essence so wherever possible it is important for us to give such assurances for the future, both in seeing the Bill on to the statute book and thereafter. I hope and infer from that response that research will be ongoing.
	On my Amendment No. 4, yes, we referred to those on low incomes. I would certainly not want to be accused of being patronising in any way. I refer to the assistance given by the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, who explained that we want to protect those who can ill-afford to cope with an effect that will be more powerful on those who have less to lose, if I may put it that way. I do not believe that people on low incomes are at more risk of more gambling, but the effect on people on low incomes may be more powerful.
	In that sense, I am grateful, as I am sure is the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, for the Minister's response to Amendment No. 52A, when he accepted that it will be important for the commission to take into account children and families when assessing or reviewing codes of practice for gambling and gaming in future.
	I am concerned about the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Howe. We are considering a similar issue of evidence. It is tremendously important, if such a big decision is to be taken to remove the right of children to play category D machines, that that is based on serious evidence. In that event, we are talking about destroying an industry—yes, it is an industry—that has existed for many years and, as my noble friend Lord Ullswater said, provided a huge amount of enjoyment for young people—including me, when I was a child. In fact, I must say that I was quickly put off gambling for ever, rather like the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, although I thought that he said that he bet on a dog—

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment Nos. 3 to 5 not moved.]
	Clause 1 agreed to.
	Clauses 2 to 4 agreed to.
	Clause 5 [Facilities for gambling]:

Lord Clement-Jones: I will be brief in moving this amendment, because, as it happens, the Minister has fulfilled the expectations of him in putting forward his own amendments under this group, Amendments Nos. 7 and 8.
	The Explanatory Notes to the Bill state that mobile telephone operators
	"who do nothing more than act as a carrier of information for persons providing facilities for gambling or for consumers partaking in gambling"
	will not require regulation under the Bill. My motive in putting down Amendment No. 6 was simply that subsection (3) appeared to be one of the areas in the Bill that did not reflect this principle, and there was a risk that mobile operators could be required to be licensed merely for providing third-party gambling services. The Minister has now cured that with his amendments. I beg to move.

Baroness Buscombe: I will be brief. Forgive me if I repeat some of what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has already said. I welcome the Government's concession to the concerns raised by the mobile phone operators to Clause 5. They welcome the explanation on page 10 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, which clarifies subsection (2)(c) of Clause 5, stating that mobile telephone operators
	"who do nothing more than act as a carrier of information for persons providing facilities for gambling or consumers partaking in gambling"
	will not require regulation under the Bill. However, several areas remain in the Bill that do not appear to reflect this principle, and there was a clear risk that mobile operators could be required to be licensed, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has said, merely for providing third-party gambling services.
	There are still issues with Schedules 1 and 2, which we will discuss later. In particular, Clause 5(3)(b) explained that the exemptions in subsections in subsection (2)(c) are disapplied if,
	"the facilities are adapted or presented in such a way as to facilitate, or draw attention to the possibility of, their use for gambling".
	Mobile operators currently provide access to a number of third-party betting intermediary services that are available from their WAP portals. This provides a direct link to the gambling operators' own branded websites. In this situation, the mobile operator is merely providing a link between the third party and customers, yet would seem to be caught by the definition in the unamended Bill.
	It was argued that it is too simplistic to say that merely pointing to a gambling site is providing facilities for gambling and will unnecessarily bring within gambling regulation platform providers for whom it would simply not be relevant to acquire a gambling licence.
	Can the Minister indicate the type of criteria that may be used in subsection (4)(c) and (f) of the government amendment?

Baroness Buscombe: In moving the amendment, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 12, 180, 221 and 363.
	This group of amendments addresses the important issues of identity and money laundering. The three licensing objectives that underpin the Bill are: first, preventing gambling being a source of crime or being associated with crime; secondly, ensuring that gambling is conducted in a fair and open manner; and thirdly, protecting children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling.
	However, it remains unclear how the Bill can achieve those objectives in respect of casinos, when it will also remove the current requirement to check the identity of every customer before they enter a casino. Currently, every customer entering a casino must either be a registered member, having registered with the casino at least 24 hours earlier—as stated in the membership rule—or a member's guest who can provide satisfactory evidence of their identity.
	I wish to take a little time to outline the detail of the amendments. The first is essential and all the other amendments in my name consequentially flow from it. Amendments Nos. 10 and 363 deal with the definition of a casino. It is currently defined in the Bill under this clause as "an arrangement" and, therefore, includes online casinos. The amendment is necessary to include a definition of "casino premises" to identify the physical building where the public may enter and where ID will be required.
	Amendment No. 12 ensures that an offence under Part 4, with regard to allowing a child or young person to gamble, will be treated as an offence against the mandatory conditions of a licence as prescribed by my Amendment No. 221 to Clause 165.
	Amendment No. 180 to Clause 149 is particularly important in this debate on identity. It ensures that the gaming floor is a "designated gaming area", separate from other entertainment facilities that may be available within the casino premises. Having been to Las Vegas with my family, that point is especially close to my heart. Such segregation is not only essential to help protect the young and vulnerable but also provides space inside, out of the rain, as often happens in the UK, whereby identity can be checked before gambling. However, that process will not detract from the entertainment of the evening as a whole or access to other non-gambling facilities.
	My amendment to Clause 165 inserts mandatory conditions on a casino premises licence; namely, that no gaming tables or machines can be operated off a designated gaming area, as I have already described; that no individuals can be admitted to that gaming area unless there is satisfactory evidence of identity; and that door supervision to the gaming area is maintained at all times when it is open. I believe that satisfactory evidence of identity should be a means of establishing the name, address and a photographic likeness of the person producing the evidence. That could easily be produced by tourists in the form of a passport, which would not rule out this important trade for casinos. It would simply require a little advertising regarding the need to bring it along.
	Once identified for the first time, it is possible that their records will be kept on a system maintained by the casino for such purposes, as many loyalty member details already are. Such ID checks would eliminate any doubt about the age of customers and enable the effective operation of self-barring schemes for problem gamblers. Most importantly, mandatory ID checks would allow for any suspicious or criminal activity, such as money laundering, to be more easily monitored and eliminated, as the details of every person on the premises would be recorded and readily available.
	At this point I make it absolutely clear that with regard to proposed regional casinos I am not asking the Government to impose an identity requirement at the entry point to the casino building itself, or buildings if it is a large complex, that is, the overall leisure facility. I am asking simply for ID to be mandatory at the point of entry to the gaming areas. In that respect, I would appreciate the Minister making it absolutely clear in his reply that there will be no merging of gambling with other leisure facilities.
	I know from personal experience that in many existing casinos across the world you will find slot machines at the point of entry to the casino building. I remember that when I visited Las Vegas for the first time, we had a difficult time checking in because we could not find anything even approaching a conventional reception desk—only machines. That must not happen in this country. We must send a clear message to the Gambling Commission that that was not Parliament's intention. The Joint Scrutiny Committee also made that point very clear in its Recommendations 5 to 8. In particular, Recommendation 5 states:
	"We support the Government's proposals to allow children into the non-gambling area of regional destination casinos, provided that there are appropriate barriers and a suitable distance between the gambling and the non-gambling areas".
	In spite of that, the Government have so far resisted calls to make ID on entry to the designated gaming areas of casinos a legal requirement, which would appear to be inherently inconsistent with their determination to introduce a national identity card scheme to protect us all from illegal, criminal and terrorist activity. The Government have argued that in the fight against crime and money laundering, money laundering regulations themselves will be sufficient. However, I believe that that is not as clear cut as the Minister would like us to believe.
	It is vital that the principle of requiring ID on entry to all gaming areas within casinos is enshrined in the Bill, so that the casino industry can remain free from money laundering and associated crimes. The appeal to criminals of a casino with no ID requirements is well illustrated in the National Money Laundering Strategy report of 26 October 2004, provided by the National Criminal Intelligence Service to Her Majesty's Treasury. It states:
	"Money launderers can take advantage of the facilities offered by casinos to disguise the origins of their funds. Launderers can take 'dirty cash' into a casino, exchange it for chips, spend a few hours gambling, and then exchange the chips (with a gain or loss according to their play) for a casino cheque which can be subsequently presented as the apparently legitimate source of funds".
	If every customer has to provide ID on entry to a gaming area, as is currently the case, it will counter any suspicious or criminal activity, such as money laundering, and allow it to be more easily and effectively monitored and eliminated.
	Currently, the EU second money laundering directive requires ID only when buying or selling a minimum of €1,000 worth of chips. However, the UK Money Laundering Regulations 2003, which implement the directive in the UK, tightened the requirements so that ID is required on entry to a UK casino. Clause 8 of the directive states:
	"A person who operates a casino by way of business in the United Kingdom must obtain satisfactory evidence of identity of any person before allowing that person to use the casino's gaming facilities".
	That tightening obviously ensures consistency with the Gaming Act 1968 24-hour rule on membership.
	The danger though is that if there is no requirement in the Gambling Bill for ID on entry to a casino, as there is in the 1968 Act, the Government are very unlikely to tighten the third EU money laundering directive currently under discussion, which, as I understand it, follows the same principle as the second directive and merely requires ID on buying or selling €1,000 worth of chips. If ID is requested only when a purchase of €1,000 or more chips is made, many customers will simply slip through the net unrecorded, which is unacceptable. I beg to move.

Lord Northbourne: I do not want to delay the Minister, but I do not understand why knowing someone's name and address is going to help stop money laundering. Will he explain?

Lord Brougham and Vaux: I remind the Committee that if Amendment No. 11 is agreed, to I cannot call Amendment No.12 because of pre-emption.

Baroness Buscombe: In moving the amendment I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 16, 178, 226, 230, 235, 245 and 364. It brings us to an important issue that created a great deal of concern among your Lordships on Second Reading with regard to the existing estate—or as I call it, UK plc.
	I wish to speak to the variety of grouped amendments, all of which deal with a possible solution for the existing gambling estate with regard to casinos as dictated by the Bill. There is a range of suggestions. I make no apology for that because it is important that we use the opportunity of Committee to try to eke out some sensible solutions to create a fair playing field for all involved in the industry.
	As such, I ask once more for your Lordships' patience while I explain the options carefully to avoid confusion. There can be no doubt that this remains a serious sticking point in the Bill. Despite the numerous government amendments—although noticeably not on this issue—it remains an issue that is yet to be resolved satisfactorily. I assume that this upset has caused the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, to table a clause stand part debate to the casino sections of the Bill.
	I would first like to expand on Amendment No. 239, which is what the industry initially proposed and would ideally like. The amendment would give the existing British casinos and their customers the same rights and opportunities that would apply to the new small and large casinos under the Bill. In essence, it would allow existing casinos the same machine-to-table ratio—namely, 2:1, up to a maximum of 80—as small casinos; or, in the case of those that match minimum size criteria for a large casino, five machines to one table up to a maximum of 150, as well as the right to offer customers sport betting facilities.
	Contrary to claims made by Ministers in another place, the amendment would result in an overall increase in the number of machines of less than 5,000 over a period of five years from the issuing of new licences, as the existing casinos have on average between 12 to 15 tables per casino. The machines would be the same limited stake and prize machines currently available in existing casinos, not the much-discussed category A machines to which the Secretary of State has been referring in the press. In our view, the debate with regard to the existing estate has moved on.
	This amendment would allow the existing estate to compete fairly with new entrants in line with the Government's policy position of June 2004. New Clause 173A, Amendment No. 245, is another option and to me the better one given that this removes the large category of casinos completely from the Bill. I was interested to hear the comments of my noble friends Lord Northesk and Lord Ullswater on the category of large casino. Amendment No. 245 results in a paving amendment, Amendment No. 15, which leads this group and removes the reference to the category in Clause 7. Amendments Nos. 16, 178, 226, 230, 235 and 364 are all consequential on this option.
	In the removal of the large category, this amendment ensures that all existing casinos, whatever their size, will be deemed as a new small category, allowing two machines per table up to a maximum of 80 and the ability to offer betting, while the minimum floor space requirement for the new small casinos will be retained as currently outlined in the Bill. However, the amendment will not allow existing permitted areas under the 1968 Act automatically to become new permitted areas and offer new licences without further application and examination by the advisory panel.
	What that does is to ensure that the advisory panel becomes a permanent element of the licensing process rather than for an experimental period only. In that regard, I thought about whether this role should rest with the Gambling Commission. However, there is a concern that that could create some conflict. Therefore, it is better to have an advisory panel that is at arm's length from the regulator, the Gambling Commission.
	The advisory panel and the power of the Secretary of State can thus be used to control proliferation on a continuing basis by defining new permitted areas and the number of licences that each may grant. That would in effect increase the number of permitted areas in a controlled way as defined by the Secretary of State. So there is a strong safeguard.
	As I understand it, local authorities wishing to grant a new small casino licence would apply to the Secretary of State. The advisory panel would advise, and the Secretary of State would issue permission for a local authority to grant one or more licences as he or she sees fit on that advice. The local authority is then obliged to grant its licence or licences in a manner directed by the Secretary of State.
	The main advantages of these proposals are as follows. The definition of the experiment becomes much clearer in that it refers only to the new regional casinos which are obviously and genuinely different from any other casino in the United Kingdom, particularly given that they are the only casinos that will have category A machines—the machines the software of which is capable of unlimited stakes and payouts, though in fact that will not be the case in all category A machines; the software as is normal is flexible.
	There are just two categories of casino—regional and small—giving clarity of offer to the public. The machine definitions remain intact. By removing the large category, 1,200 category B machines are also removed. The control on proliferation of location and numbers of machines is continuing and could be flexed or tightened by a Secretary of State in response to advice from the commission and the advisory panel. This combination of local democracy and a centrally driven strategy provides a strong social policy.
	The process is initiated by the local authority, passes through the strategy and control exercised by the advisory panel in conjunction with the Secretary of State, and returns to the local authority for both planning and licensing. The designation of existing casinos as small casinos removes the need to reclassify automatic versions of table games. The existing industry has a much fairer opportunity of competing with new entrants in seeking a small licence. It gives regulatory simplicity. In addition, there are no competition issues, as an even playing field exists for the new small licences with this amendment.
	The retention of the advisory panel as a key element of the process, and the designation of new permitted areas, means that there is a further triple-lock—local authority desire, advisory panel recommendation and the Secretary of State's approval—before a local authority can consider planning and then licensing. In effect, this is, including the commission's role, a six-lever lock. Those are strong hurdles that need to be overcome for there to be a new licence. This regime genuinely delivers the kind of gaming regime that the industry, inward investors, and commentators would find safe, workable and regenerative, without asking the Government to confront any presentationally-significant issues.
	There are many aspects of this proposal that can be properly claimed as a further tightening, particularly given that we are talking about removing altogether the category of large casinos and the number of machines that they would contain. If adopted, the changes would ensure the unequivocal support of the British industry and significantly help the Bill's passage.
	I understand that the Minister may be concerned about applications currently being considered by either the Gaming Board or justices. Growth in casino numbers over the past five years has been in single figures. The existing licensing process is effective and controlled by the Government's own regulator, the Gaming Board. I am conscious of time, but I wanted to outline the amendments clearly. I beg to move.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I have to be concerned with policy rather than atmosphere. Having said that, of course we have taken very seriously the concerns expressed by the British casino industry. We have seen members of the industry on every occasion that they have asked to see us; we have read their advertisements with great interest and increasing incredulity; and we have heard them say, as has been said today, that the Bill treats them unfairly and puts existing casinos at a competitive disadvantage. We think that those concerns have been, at the very least, overstated, but we recognise that there is an issue here which these amendments are intended to address. However, I have to say that I am unable to support them. I want to explain why and I shall go on to explain to the Committee what we see as a better approach to the issue.
	In bringing the Bill before Parliament, we have made clear from the outset our view that public protection must be a priority. In the Bill before the House, we have adopted a precautionary approach, holding back on the liberalisation of regulation until we can be sure, on the basis of practical experience, that we are not going too far too fast and that we are not letting problem gambling run out of control.
	In was on the basis of that precautionary principle, and recognising the concerns expressed very forcefully in another place at Second Reading, that we introduced an initial limit of eight as the number of casinos in each category allowed under the Bill. Whether and when those limits can be eased will depend in due course on an assessment of their impact by the Gambling Commission and on the agreement of both Houses of Parliament.
	Those limits will not affect the entitlements of existing casinos. They will continue to be able to trade as now. They will be able to enjoy some important benefits from the new system of regulation, including, for the first time, the freedom to advertise. I expect the casinos to take full advantage of this opportunity.
	But it is the case that those 137 casinos will not immediately be entitled to all the entitlements of new-style casinos. In particular, they will be limited to 10 gaming machines rather than up to 80, as proposed in the amendments, and they will not be allowed to offer betting in combination with casino gaming. We think that the impact of casinos with the additional entitlements needs to be tested and carefully evaluated before the door is opened more widely.
	On the other hand, the impact of a small number of new-style casinos on the existing industry—that is, eight plus eight plus eight—should not be exaggerated. New-style large and small casinos will not be able to offer different or better kinds of machine. People who want to play a category B machine in an existing casino will be able to do so just as readily as in a new-style casino. I think it is now accepted that category A machines, which are new, should not be introduced outside regional casinos at present.
	Nor must the pudding be over-egged in terms of betting. Existing casinos already have to compete with more than 8,000 betting shops—some of them literally next door. The addition of eight or 16 new-style casinos will not change that comparison much.
	We also need to bear in mind that we are not proposing to freeze the position of existing casinos for all time. Some have suggested that the Bill is putting them in aspic. But it seems to me that aspic dissolves; I think they really mean "concrete". But that is not the case. If the initial eight/eight/eight stage is satisfactory, it will certainly be possible to extend the entitlements more widely, including to existing casinos.
	I turn to the amendments themselves. It seems to the Government that, in straining so hard to protect existing casinos, the amendments give rise to problems far worse than those they seek to address. The first and most important point to make is that they would substantially dilute the precautionary principle. I think that if we were to return to the House of Commons a Bill which was significantly less precautionary than the one which left the House of Commons, we would receive very powerful resistance—I do not know about Front-Benchers but certainly from Back-Benchers of all parties.
	Instead of testing, as we are doing, in a number of locations the impact of casinos which have a significantly increased number of machines, we would be rushing straight into allowing every casino in the country to do so, together with additional new casinos. The machines may be familiar, but the effects of concentrating them and allowing proliferation of venues are not familiar. We would, almost at a stroke, be looking at 10,000 new category B machines and potentially far more than that—I shall explain my figures in a minute—without any kind of prior test or assessment. The number of casinos allowed to have 80 category B machines each could easily double.
	The point is that between Royal Assent and the commencement of this part of the Bill the existing 1968 Act will still apply. That means that new casinos can open up in permitted areas. If we have the attraction of the benefits offered to these casinos by these amendments, then there is—I am not good at betting analogies—a high probability that a significant number, possibly double the number of existing casinos, would open between now and the time the Act comes into force. The noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, says 5,000. I think it could be significantly more than 10,000 before we get to the end of this process.

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: We have a number of preparatory steps to make and there will be different commencement times for different parts of the Bill. It will certainly not be less than 18 months from now.
	As I have said, there is a clear prospect under the Bill as drafted that existing casinos will become small or large casinos depending on their size. By the way, they have 10 or 15 machines at the moment, as the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe says; but there is nothing to stop them under grandfather rights from buying the shop next door or opening up another floor, and having more space for more machines within the 2:1 ratio. It would be dangerous and wrong, however, to prejudge the outcome of the testing period of the impact of the new casinos in a limited number of areas.
	The second point is that the arrangements proposed in the amendments for deciding where the new casinos might be established, and how many there would be, might be arbitrary. There are huge difficulties which the amendments do not address. Supposing Hammersmith and Fulham or the City of London were to be designated as new permitted areas. What criteria should determine the number of casino licenses available there? It is one thing to look to an independent advisory panel to identify the right areas to test out new-style casinos—the task we are setting the advisory panel on a once-and-for-all basis—but another thing to expect the panel to undertake a permanent system of rationing. That is what these amendments do. It would be impossible to codify and police. We would be keeping exactly the elements of the present law—permitted areas and demand tests—which have proved the most unsatisfactory.
	The third point is related to that: that the amendments maintain barriers to entry. British casinos have been talking about a level playing field. This is not a level playing field. These amendments would tilt the playing field permanently to the advantage of the existing casinos. They would have all the entitlements of the new-style casinos immediately, whereas potential newcomers would have to compete against each other for a rationed number of new licences, and to meet the costs of winning those competitions. That is not a sustainable position.
	We do not want to freeze the number of casinos opening under the present law. It must be right to allow some natural growth in the market between now and the implementation of the Bill. We are proposing, subject to consultation, to make changes in planning use classes to guard against uncontrolled proliferation during the transitional period. In other words, we will need planning permission to open new casinos.
	The amendments, however, would make the grandfather rights enjoyed by existing casinos far more valuable. There could be a huge surge in applications in order to get in under the wire. That would be thoroughly undesirable. It could risk creating exactly the proliferation of casino gambling which we want to avoid. The number of casinos, as I have said, could quickly double.
	The fourth point is that the amendments propose the removal from the Bill of the category of large casinos. I find it strange that we have been criticised for departing in relatively modest ways from the advice of the scrutiny committee, but the Opposition are now proposing a much more radical departure.
	I must say that I started by thinking that the removal of large casinos was a precautionary measure, because we are getting rid of the potential for 1,200 machines, but, if we look at it realistically, what it would achieve is not so much the removal of 1,200 machines but protection for the new, small casinos, which are the existing casinos plus some others. I do not find that an attractive prospect.
	So I fear that, taken together, the amendments will not facilitate the development of a fair and open gambling market. They will place more emphasis on the protection of a small number of companies—basically, four companies—than on the protection of the public as a whole.
	The Committee will think that I have been rather aggressive about that, I am sure, and I probably have, because I am really concerned about the protection of the public and avoiding proliferation and increases in problem gambling. But we have looked again at what can properly be done to recognise the legitimate interests of the established industry, and I have always, as I have today, praised it for having a good track record of responsibility and integrity.
	In the first place, we have prepared Amendment No. 233, which is in the next group, which takes automated casino gaming tables of the kind now on offer in many casinos here, out of the definition of gaming machines. We think that that is right because there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing the equipment from gaming machines. That will also mean that casinos do not have to count those machines against their allowance of gaming machines. In other words, casinos will not be penalised for innovation.
	Secondly, we think that it would now be reasonable, without weakening the overriding precautionary principle, to increase the entitlement to category B machines in existing casinos from 10 to 20. That is in addition to the reclassification of automated tables. By the way, that does not involve any change in the Bill.
	If there is any requirement for it, we would be prepared to discuss some increase in the prizes—the maximum limit—for category B gaming machines. We could very well discuss that with the casino industry. Of course, any change of that sort would have to be very carefully monitored.
	So I am not resisting without any possibility of change, discussion or negotiation, but I hope that the Committee will agree that the changes that I am talking about, together with the arguments against the amendments, go as far as it is reasonable and prudent to go in the direction of helping the casino industry but not gambling with the protection of the public. We are simply not willing to do that.

Baroness Buscombe: They will have the opportunity of opening casinos between now and the enactment of this Bill. But the Minister confirmed to me that we are that that may possibly be 18 months from now. There is a limited ability for most clubs to grow in current premises, and moving the entire British estate to new premises would take years. It takes time to process the introduction of new premises. I cannot see that there would be a mass proliferation under the wire between now and the introduction of the new legislation.
	There is also genuine concern that if others are awarded licences to open casinos within close proximity to the current estate, they will be allowed to have many more machines and a much more exciting venue as a result. Also, large size means the possibility for more payouts. We are considering what we believe to be an anti-competitive situation. I heard the noble Lord say that he believed that the proposal put to him this evening would create an anti-competitive position with regard to the new entrants. I cannot see that. Under this proposal, new entrants would be allowed to apply on an equal basis with enormously strong safeguards. We are not talking about a triple-lock, but a six-lock approach.
	The Government are talking about a precautionary principle. But I do not believe that we are seeking would remove the precautionary principle if at the same time we would remove the category of large casinos altogether—that would remove 1,200 machines from the Government's proposed landscape. The Minister has suggested that the proposal would lead to an additional 10,000 machines. I do not accept that.
	There will be a test period, during which the Government propose that the existing estate will not be able to increase the number of machines. However, there is a real concern that during that period the new entrants will be given opportunities of which the existing estate will be deprived. I take on board the example that the Minister gave regarding Hammersmith and Fulham having to decide the criteria that should determine whether or not a new casino should be opened. Maybe we should look again at the amendment and, instead of relying entirely on a permanent advisory panel to police this, consider how we could more carefully link in the regulatory role of the Gambling Commission to this proposal.
	I do not wish to press this issue tonight. However, there are opportunities between now and Royal Assent for noble Lords to think with care and to urge the Minister to take these proposals on board. I accept, and welcome, that the Minister wants to assure the current estate that its future is not as bleak as it has suggested—that the future is, indeed, rosy—but I still need to be persuaded of that. I believe that between now and Royal Assent it might be possible to find a solution that might be more equitable than that proposed by the Government. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Buscombe: I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wade, on the proposed regional casinos. I visited Las Vegas and I do not remember taking part in any betting. I was there for the leisure facilities and to see the amazing spectacle. When I have, on rare occasions, visited smaller casinos where the high rollers play, I have seen that the focus is on gambling. It seems extraordinary that we are putting category A machines in the huge regional casinos and minimising the different gambling opportunities within the smaller casinos.
	This has been an interesting debate. I take on board what the Minister has said. I shall consider it with care and read what he has said in Hansard, particularly in relation to his Amendment No. 233 and to auto roulette. Those are all important issues. In some sense, we are all conscious that time is not on our side. Unfortunately, not withstanding the fact that the Bill has received pre-legislative scrutiny, noble Lords are quite rightly used to debating all the important, and sometimes not so important, issues on the Floor of your Lordships' House at leisure, but tonight we are very much constrained. I am grateful to the Minister for what he has said and, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Greaves: I rise to oppose the Question that Clause 7 stand part of the Bill. That heads a long group of amendments in my name including Amendments Nos. 102 and 107, whether Clauses 149 and 164 stand part, Amendments Nos. 224 and 234, and whether Schedule 9 stands part. It should also include Amendments Nos. 176A and 176B, which I apologise got delayed a day in their circulation in the supplementary list because for some reason the clause and line numbers that I submitted had gone through some sort of random number generator before they got to the Public Bill Office and they were therefore gibberish. They can be taken as discussed.
	I have made a fairly rough and ready attempt to remove those parts of the Bill that refer to the new casinos—regional, large and small. I do not claim that I have done a proper filleting job on the Bill. I will attempt to do a much better, more efficient and more comprehensive job and bring it back at Report for further discussion. I look forward to that exciting occasion. In the event, I am clearly putting this forward as a probing set of amendments to allow the matter to be discussed.
	There are two possibilities. One is that we all meet again on 7 April and then the Bill goes through to Report. The second is that it all ends up in the wash-up. I believe that there is a large body of opinion that large and complex Bills like this going through the wash-up is not satisfactory. The Bill, by and large, is regarded as a good, worthwhile measure and one that has had a great deal of discussion and consideration.
	The sections referring to the new casinos, on the other hand, are far more controversial from a number of different points of view. I had an interesting communication this morning from the Casino Operators' Association of the UK—the COA—which wrote to me as follows:
	"There is somewhat of an impasse in negotiations with DCMS. Unless the Government makes concessions in line with our substantial recommendations, we feel that the most prudent next course of action would be to remove the casino sections from the legislation altogether. The Government and the casino industry needs more time to consider the best way forward and it has become increasingly apparent that this will not be possible until after the General Election".
	The COA sets out a number of reasons for that, which have essentially been covered and discussed in Committee today, only one of which has been satisfactorily dealt with perhaps—the question of ID on entry. I will not read them all out because they are well known and have been raised from various parts of the House during the debate.
	I tend to come from a rather different direction from that of the COA, in believing that, nevertheless, the best course of action would be to take the casino provisions out of the Bill—particularly if there is to be a wash-up procedure—and for the Government to bring back a new Bill after the election in which these matters can be further discussed.
	As my noble friend said, there are many things in the Bill that we ought to discuss in detail, for which we are not now going to get time. I do not intend to discuss them in detail now, not least because the time for dinner is rapidly approaching. But on the matter of the three new categories of casinos, there is a great deal that needs to be discussed, scrutinised and looked at hard. The Government have not got the system properly sorted out yet. We had a long discussion about regional casinos earlier, but I did not get satisfactory answers from the Minister—I am sorry to tell him that.
	The question of advertising is highly controversial, though that is not so much advertising for people to travel in the destination or resort sense to gambling casinos. If people are travelling from London to Edinburgh to visit a big new casino, that is one thing, but whether local advertising is desirable to attract local people in—whether in a big city or a relatively medium-sized place such as a seaside resort, where they may be 60, 100, 150 or 200 people living nearby—needs to be thrashed out properly.
	On inducements, there is a lot of evidence from places such as Detroit that providing free food, hotel rooms and transport—buses or trams to visit the casinos if it is Blackpool—can contribute greatly to addiction and problem gambling. I do not believe that the question of problem gambling as a public health concern in the surrounding areas of the casinos has yet been discussed properly.
	I listened with a certain amount of bewilderment to the previous discussion about the interaction between the different permissions that will be needed for casinos. The relationship between the national decision-making process dealing with which places will be allowed to have casinos, which involves the Secretary of State and members of his advisory committee—whoever they turn out to be—and the operators licences is fairly straightforward. However, the premises licences and the planning permission for some of the big, controversial proposals have not been sorted out properly. Inevitably, there will be a sense in which national decisions are made, a list of places is drawn up and effectively that will be a fait accompli. The rollercoaster will start and the local planning and premises licence processes will be a matter of bidding—how it will be done, where it will be and what it will be like rather than, "Is this something that we want, yes or no?" That will lead to a huge amount of local public anger and confusion. The process has not been thought out at all.
	I do not think that competition with existing local businesses and the local economy has been thought out properly. I do not know whether the Government have produced estimates—they do not seem to have produced estimates for many things that will be consequences of this Bill.

Lord Greaves: If I said that I had read every word of that report, I would not be telling the truth, but I have read a great deal of it. I have certainly gone through it all. At Second Reading, I complimented the committee on its work because the Bill as a whole is now very much better than it would have been had that process not taken place. I made that absolutely clear. I believe that the Bill as a whole, apart from the casino provisions, is actually a good Bill that deserves to be passed by this House. My answer to the noble Lord is that the questions that I am raising have not been answered.
	The question of job displacement has not been satisfactorily sorted out. Evidence was given to that committee but the committee does not appear to have taken satisfactory note of it. I do not believe that the Government have come to a view about how many of the new jobs that are created in the big new casinos—whether regional, large or whatever—will simply be displacing other jobs either because of competition within the gambling industry or competition generally. Apart from people travelling long distances, there will not be any extra money. The people who go locally may visit in large numbers but they will not have extra money. They will simply be spending it in different places.
	Finally, we ought to have a serious argument about whether eight is the right number.
	Finally, we ought to have a serious argument about whether eight is the right number. The Minister said there is nothing special about eight, it is just an adequate number. If the Government really want trials and pilots, then eight seems too many. They could have their trials and pilots by having two at seaside locations and two at major urban centres, as an excellent report from NERA—I have forgotten its full title—points out. That would provide all the evidence needed to—

Lord McIntosh of Haringey: I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, and well understand the point that he is making, which is a principled case against having casinos in the Bill at all. I assume that what he means is that there should be no change in the casino law. It does not really matter what the amendments say; clearly they could be sorted out afterwards if there were general support for them. But I take it that he means to leave casino law as it is at the moment rather than to abolish casinos altogether; he is nodding, so I believe that must be right.
	My position is that the Government's policy is a cautious and sensible approach to a part of our national life that the majority of people regard as a safe and normal activity. Therefore, I do not think that the noble Lord's position truly represents what most people think about casinos. Most people look on casinos and gambling in general as a leisure choice for informed adults. They know that it has risks like many activities in life and they accept that with careful regulation it can be a normal part of a good night out.
	I am glad that the noble Lord raised the core point of whether the Bill should deal with casinos because I want to set out what we would lose if we took out the casino part of the Bill. We would lose the potential for regeneration. Many local authorities want the inward investment, the new jobs and the visitors that casinos will bring with them. New casinos provide not only a range of gambling facilities but hotel accommodation, conference facilities, restaurants, areas for live entertainment and so on. If there is an issue of job displacement, the membership of the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Wade, shows that it has been carefully considered.
	Lots of local authorities have written to us saying that they would welcome such developments. We think it is right that we give a limited number of local authorities the opportunity. That is why the powers for local authorities in Schedule 9 to secure benefits for their area are so important. At the same time, there is provision in the Bill for any local authority that wishes to opt out altogether from new casinos. So there is no forcing casinos down the throats of communities that do not want them.
	If we did not have this part we would abandon choice for consumers. Many people enjoy gambling. We want to ensure that protections are in place for the small minority of people for whom gambling becomes a problem, but we think that it is right to extend choice for adult gamblers. We would set back the development of the British casino industry, which has proved its integrity and probity over the past 40 years. With new technology, new games and changes in society it is different from the industry regulated by the Gaming Act 1968, which would have to continue in force. The industry has earned the right to be allowed to develop, cautiously.
	We would keep unnecessary and burdensome regulation. We think that it is right to remove outdated regulations that do not contribute to the delivery of the three regulatory objectives. The industry and the customers would be left with a regulatory regime that was created for a different industry at a different time. Casino developments would be permitted in a relatively small number of urban areas. The membership requirement—the 24-hour rule—will remain. We will heavily restrict the ability of casinos to advertise and there will be strict limits on the number and type of machine that they have.
	A great opportunity to achieve a modern and responsible regulatory framework would be lost and an important and successful part of the leisure industry would be stopped in its tracks. We think that every part of the Bill contributes to the wellbeing of the country.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, the provisions are back; we have to consider them again. The Government have taken the view that we should take the advice of the security services on what the right approach should be. We have considered the advice that we have received and we have accepted it.
	The continuing disagreement between the Commons and the Lords is against the following background. Very significant changes have been made to the Bill as a result of the provisions of this House. I draw attention to the following changes that have been made: prejudicial scrutiny before orders are made; much clearer rules provisions; explicit provisions for certification that prosecution is not possible; and a review clause. We have moved as a Government and we have moved significantly. But we as a Government believe that our prime job is to protect our people against terrorism.
	We have put this to both Houses of Parliament. The Commons have take their decision. The safety of the nation has been at the forefront of all of our concerns about the Bill. We have listened and we have made concessions. But now we have arrived at a time when a decision has to be made.
	Our approach, as I have said, has been guided by the advice we have received from the security services and from the police. We need the Bill to protect us now. We do so in the context of the Law Lords' judgment. The principle on which the majority of this House is agreed is the need for control orders.
	Of course it is right that Parliament should have scrutiny of this legislation through annual review, but not through a clause that has the effect of destroying the Bill after a period of time in the face of an immediate threat. Of course the protection of civil liberties is the responsibility of any government, and we accept that responsibility.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, it would not be impossible for the Government to do that. But the critical point is that we have made a whole range of very significant concessions on the basis of the detail of this. The idea that an artificial deadline imposed by this House is the right way to deal with the fight against terrorism is—with the greatest respect to every Member of the House, who I have absolutely no doubt has at heart the safety of the nation—wrong. The right way to deal with it is to put before both Houses of Parliament our proposal on fighting terrorism, to listen to what is said about how it may best be amended and then to amend it, which is what we have done. Ultimately, we do need to make decisions as a government about what is the best way to fight terrorism. Of course, each House must put before us their individual views about the best way to do it, but ultimately we must put a proposal, we must address the Commons about it, and it must make a decision on it.
	A time has come when our approach to terrorism requires clear leadership. The Government are providing it; and the Commons has backed the approach that the Government are taking. We cannot go on in this state of indecision. This House may disagree, and it disagrees plainly, in good faith, and on the basis of its judgment. Ultimately, our system requires a decision. There is no issue more important on which a decision is required than the fight against terrorism. Our constitution requires that that decision is left to those in the Commons. They have listened to what we have said; we have made amendments on the basis of it, but ultimately, the decision is theirs; and if we do not accept that the decision is theirs, there is no leadership. As a constitution, we accept the primacy of those in the Commons. Yes, you can disagree with them, and yes, you can ask them to listen again, but you must ultimately accept that the Commons is the prime House in our Parliament. It is difficult, but that is what is required. I beg to move.
	Moved, That this House do not insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 1A and 1B to Lords Amendment No. 1; do not insist on its Amendments Nos. 37Q to 37T in lieu of Lords Amendment No. 8 to which the Commons have disagreed; do not insist on their insistence on Lords Amendments Nos. 12, 13, 15, 17, 22, 28 and 37 in respect of which the Commons have insisted on their disagreement and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 37A to 37O in lieu of those Lords Amendments; and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 17H to 17M to the words restored to the Bill by the Commons insistence on their disagreement to Lords Amendment No. 17.—(Lord Falconer of Thoroton.)

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, the substance of the Motion concerns three matters, none of which was mentioned by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor in his opening remarks—these are the judicialisation of non-derogating orders, the balance of probabilities and the role of the DPP. On none of them have the Government given any ground at all, despite the plain fact that the judicial role is totally excluded from most of the manner in which non-derogating control orders are made.
	Instead, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor chose to deliver to your Lordships' House an ultimatum about the relative power of another place. I recall earlier today the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, saying that your Lordships would have to bow to the other place. But we have our constitutional duty in this House, which has been given to us by, among other institutions, another place. It would be wholly wrong for us to shirk it tonight.
	There have been many suggestions from the Government Benches here and in another place that, in supporting amendments to the Bill, we on these Benches are in some way encouraging terrorism. We totally repudiate that. What could give greater succour to the terrorists than the permanent suspension of habeas corpus? That is what the Government seek. By refusing to grant us a sunset clause, they are giving themselves an open-ended right never to bring back trial by jury again in a certain class of cases. That would be the first great victory of terrorism over our free society.
	The position of the Government is incomprehensible. It is either breathtakingly naive or deeply duplicitous; and we must oppose it tonight.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: No, no, no, my Lords. At the time that noble Lord, Lord Baker, locked up 12 people there was no process that could remotely be described as fair. Indeed, the process was then struck down by the European Court. So it is absolutely ridiculous to describe that process as being fair.
	My point is this. There are disagreements between us—legitimate disagreements. I respect the noble Lord, Lord Baker, for changing his view but, ultimately, there are 650-odd people in the Commons who are accountable to their constituents and who must make the decision about it. They must listen to us, and they have. We have made very significant changes to the Bill as regards civil liberties and the way that it operates. You could not possibly say that the Commons has not listened. Ultimately, do we know best?

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. A1) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 182; Not-Contents, 111.

Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.
	Motion, as amended, agreed to.
	Motion, as amended, agreed to.
	:TITLE3:MOTION B

(LORDS AMENDMENT 33)

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
	[The Sitting was suspended from 11.26 p.m. to 5 a.m.]
	[For continuation of proceedings, see Official Report for Thursday, 10 March 2005 Part 2.]

Prevention of Terrorism Bill—Commons Amendments and Reasons (continued)

[Continuation of Official Report from col. 1018, Part 1 of Thursday, 10 March 2005.]

:TITLE3:COMMONS AMENDMENTS AND REASONS
	[The page and line refer to HL Bill 34 as first printed for the Lords.]
	A message was brought from the Commons, That they do not insist on certain amendments to which the Lords have disagreed and propose amendments in lieu to which they desire the agreement of your Lordships; they insist on their amendments to the words to be restored to the Bill, to which they desire the agreement of your Lordships; they insist on their amendments in lieu, to which they desire the agreement of your Lordships; they insist on their disagreement to certain other Lords amendments; and they insist on the amendments in lieu thereof to which they desire the agreement of your Lordships; they insist on certain amendments to Lords amendments disagreed to by the Lords; they insist on their disagreement to certain amendments to Lords amendments; they insist on their disagreement to certain other Lords amendments and Lords amendments in lieu.

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, I have spoken to the substance of Motions B1 and C1. I beg to move.
	Moved, as an amendment to Motion B, leave out from "House" to end and insert "do insist on Lords Amendments Nos. 27, 31 and 32; do insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 27C and 27D in lieu.—(Lord Kingsland.) and do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 32D in lieu".—(Lord Kingsland.)

Lord Morris of Aberavon: My Lords, I shall be brief. The House will know that I voted against the Government on their proposals for non-derogating orders. The Government have moved a long way since then, and I am satisfied on the principle of judicial involvement. It is a matter of vital importance. There have been other solid concessions since then.
	I say in passing that, as Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, I appointed the first special counsel, after discussion with the Bar; likewise in England and Wales. The situation has developed since then, and it can and, I am sure, will be improved. However, on the burden of proof I say, with my limited experience, that it is not possible to import what is essentially a civil connotation into what is essentially an assessment of a threat, not an assessment of whether an offence has been committed. Indeed, the test in criminal law would be much higher. You cannot cobble together a civil concept of that kind with the assessment of a threat.
	Since then, I have voted for the Government on all amendments, save one, although the Bill is far from perfect, and I doubt that I would have started from the position that the Government first took. I fear that there was a lack of realpolitik in the Government's proposals and a failure to understand what is constitutionally important.
	I voted against the sunset clause specifying 30 November. The period was ridiculously short. I abstained from voting on the proposal for a period of one year made by my noble friend Lady Hayman. There was no magic in one year. I understand, as we all do now, the distinction between an annual review and a sunset clause.
	I have only modest and limited experience of intelligence problems, as a Defence Minister in the 1960s, disappointed by intelligence sources, and as Attorney-General here, and in Northern Ireland, in the 1990s. I know a little from five departments of state the difficulties of drafting sound legislation. I believe in the primacy of the Commons. The comments made last night would make David Lloyd George, my boyhood hero, turn in his grave. He had some choice expressions. Certainly in his Poplar speech, which is too insulting to repeat, he talked about the then Membership of the House of Lords. I suspect—and I say this to the Liberal Democrat Benches—that he would have had something to say tonight.
	Honour has been talked about. I heard it on the airwaves today. More important, I would suggest, is a recognition of the importance of Parliament and the place of the Commons. Is it too late for common sense to prevail? If the date of 30 November is too short—ridiculously short—and one year is felt to be too short, why not in two years from now end the present Bill, which was cobbled together in its original unsatisfactory form in two months? If the date is not acceptable, surely a proper sound Bill could be prepared in two years, which the Government intend to do in any event. Is not saying two years a way forward and a way to save the reputation of both our Houses?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, the noble Baroness puts her finger on the problem: we do want to try to unite both Houses. That is why throughout this 24-hour period and before we have introduced sensible provisions, very similar to the provisions introduced where there are problems of this sort, which go as far as we believe we can—that is, the review and the renewal procedures—without going as far as leaving open the possibility of there being no anti-terrorism law. Does this House think it possible that it would not agree with the detail of a terrorist law that the Government produced? Look at the debates that have gone on in relation to this.
	The other place does not want a sunset clause. They have expressed that opinion time and time and time again over the past 24 hours.
	We have been striving, over the past 24 hours and before, to get to the point where there is that review but there is no uncovered period. I earnestly ask noble Lords to look and see what has been done about review and renewal through this process and to accept that it is a bona fide attempt to deal with the quite legitimate points made by noble Lords in this House.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, I have certainly not expressed a contemptuous view about this House. Since I have been here for the past seven years, I have always understood the constitutional position to be, as someone said, that we have the power to delay and we have the power by that power to delay to make the other place think again. We have used that power. There are legitimate and bona fide reasons why the other place has taken the view that the sunset clause is not the appropriate way to deal with it.
	I ask this House to accept the bona fides of the other place in that respect; I ask the House to accept the bona fides of the Government in taking this view; and I ask this House to stop blocking the Prevention of Terrorism Bill.

On Question, Whether the said Motion (No. C1) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 194; Not-Contents, 123.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Motion agreed to accordingly.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, both Houses of Parliament have laboured hard to craft an effective Prevention of Terrorism Bill. This House has made a significant contribution to that process, and significant amendments have been made as a result of the work that we have done.
	We reached a point earlier today—when I say "today", I mean Thursday, which has still not come to an end in this House—at which agreement was close. The problems related to the burden of proof and a sunset clause. For a variety of reasons, a sunset clause was not acceptable and nor was the burden of proof. Concern was also raised about the need for this House to be able to amend the Bill in the future, if research revealed that it was not performing its job appropriately.
	After much work—I pay tribute to my right honourable friend the Home Secretary for the huge contribution that he made—an acceptable solution has, I believe, been found. As my noble friend Lady Scotland of Asthal made clear on 10 March—at cols. 897 and 898 of Hansard—an important method by which these matters could be dealt with was amendment of the Bill that we are about to pass through our forthcoming Bill on acts preparatory to terrorism. That depends on our ensuring that there is an effective timetable in which that process can take place, a timetable that would allow consideration in the future, after there had been a report by the reviewer who we agreed should be included in the Bill.
	In another place, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary suggested a timetable along the following lines: Royal Assent to this Bill in March 2005; the appointment of an independent reviewer of this Bill in March 2005; the publication of the draft counter-terrorism Bill, which will deal with acts preparatory to terrorism, and the start of pre-legislative scrutiny in late autumn 2005; and the presentation to the Home Secretary of the first report of the independent reviewer and the laying of the report before Parliament by the Home Secretary early in 2006. The report will include the reviewer's report on the operation of the current Bill and the implications of the new offences for this Bill.
	The new counter-terrorism Bill will be introduced into the Commons in spring 2006, and the renewal of this Bill's life will be in March 2006. Until approximately July 2006, we will have the passage of the new counter-terrorism Bill through Parliament, with Royal Assent—approximately—in July 2006. That will allow the process of reviewing this Bill and the passage of a vehicle in which any amendments can be made to go on at the same time. Although those amendments could, technically, include complete repeal, we believe that that will not arise. The effect of the review taking place will be that this could be looked at.
	We believe that the proposal brings together all parties' concerns but allows them to preserve the positions that they have taken, and I invite all parties in the House to recognise the value of the proposal and to rally round the Commons amendments as a result. The proposal is made in a constructive spirit and I hope that the House will view it in that way.
	Before I close, I want to thank the following people: the staff of Hansard, who will be here for several more hours; our Doorkeepers; our Clerks; the staff of the Printed Paper Office, who have performed remarkably; the Public Bill Office; the Refreshment Department, which even now remains inundated; and our security staff. This is the longest ever recorded Sitting of the House. The previous record was 19 hours on the Gas Bill on 3 and 4 June 1986. We have overtaken that record. My only sorrow is that I was not able to go around to each of the former Conservative Home Secretaries and congratulate them on their previous speeches. I beg to move.
	Moved, That this House do not insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 1A and 1B to Lords Amendment No. 1; do not insist on its Amendments Nos. 37Q, 37S, 37T and 37Y in lieu of Lords Amendment No. 8; do not insist on its insistence on Lords Amendments Nos. 12, 13, 15, 17, 22, 28 and 37 in respect of which the Commons have insisted on their disagreement and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 37A to 37C and 37E to 37O and 37X in lieu of those Lords amendments; and do not insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 17H to 17M to the words restored to the Bill by the Commons insistence on their disagreement to Lords Amendment No. 17.—(Lord Falconer of Thoroton.)